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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation is to recommend an alternative approach to the fraud 
exception in South African law. The Current South African position as with the 
English law, places more weight on upholding the sanctity of the autonomy principle 
in letters of credit than preventing fraud. This is mainly because the courts have 
traditionally taken the view that protection of the autonomy principle is central to 
promoting the needs of trade and maintaining the integrity of the international banking 
community. Hence, this dissertation argues that an approach to the fraud exception in 
South African law that is more in line with that of the American law and/or the 
UNCITRAL Convention strikes a better balance in upholding the value of letters of 
credit and combatting fraud than the current South African position. Based on the 
comparative analysis of the position in the United Kingdom, United States of America 
and under the UNCITRAL Convention, the dissertation seeks to draw upon important 
lessons and principles pivotal to a preferable approach to the fraud exception in South 
African law that would enhance a better balance between the autonomy arguments and 
deterrence of fraud.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
I Aim of the Dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to argue for an alternative approach to the fraud 
exception in South African law. The main argument of the dissertation is that an 
approach to the fraud exception in South African law that is in line with or more in 
line with, that of the American law and/or the UNCITRAL Convention strikes a better 
balance in upholding the value of letters of credit and combatting fraud than the current 
South African position.1 In South Africa, as in England, the courts seem to have 
embraced the strict approach to the fraud rule. However, it is observed that the 
requirements of such a stringent approach to the fraud exception, which is heavily 
centred on maintaining the sanctity of the autonomy principle in letters of credit may 
in certain instances create undesirable situation of protecting fraudsters.2 
The dissertation employs a comparative analysis of the South African position 
with the position in the United Kingdom, United States of America and under the 
UNCITRAL Convention with the objective of drawing important lessons and make 
recommendations for a preferable approach based on the American law and the 
UNCITRAL Convention that strikes a better balance in the application of the fraud 
exception than the current South African position.  
II Background 
Historically, letters of credit have played a fundamental role as a payment method in 
the financing of international trade. The efficacy and commercial utility of letters of 
credit has been described by the judges as the ‘life blood of international commerce’.3 
The appeal of letters of credit lies in their inherent important nature being that they are 
independent of the underlying transaction on which they are based. This fundamental 
principle is known as the autonomy principle. In international sale transactions, the 
                                               
 
1 In particular, article 19 and 20 of the United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and 
Standby Letters of Credit (‘UNCITRAL Convention’), issued by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations at its fiftieth session by resolution No.48 on 11 December 1995 and entered into force 
on 1 January 2000. The Convention is designed to facilitate the use of independent guarantees and 
standby letters of credit, in particular where only one or the other of those instruments may be 
traditionally in use. The UNCITRAL Convention has a binding force of law only to parties in countries 
that are signatories and have ratified it. 
2 See X Gao The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (2002) 98. 
3 Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146 at 155. 
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immediate payment in exchange for goods is practically impossible. The letter of credit 
offers the seller with the means to reduce the risk of non-payment on the part of the 
seller by substituting the buyer’s promise to pay for that of a bank, a more reliable and 
solvent paymaster in the seller’s country.   
However, the autonomy principle has been challenged with the problems of 
fraud. A case in point would arise in circumstances where the goods are not as per the 
contract of sale or the documents presented contain misrepresentation of facts. The 
fact that any one of these factors could vitiate the letter of credit raises very crucial 
questions that trenches upon the autonomy principle. Will the bank be allowed to 
refuse to pay under the letter of credit in these circumstances? Secondly, should the 
buyer be made to bear liability in the event of a fraudulent demand for payment by the 
beneficiary? Unfortunately, the UCP does not contain provisions that address the fraud 
issue.4 As a result of this inactive position of the UCP, most jurisdictions have adopted 
different approaches in defining the limits and application of the fraud exception. 
Central to the application of the fraud rule, is the need for a balanced 
consideration that ‘there is just as much public interest in discouraging fraud as in 
encouraging the use of letters of credit.’5 Thus, proper application of the fraud 
exception requires striking a particular balance between the two competing interests.6 
First, on the one hand, the need to preserve the autonomy principle of letters of credit, 
which advances the wider public interest of promoting international trade by 
facilitating the efficacy and utility of letters of credit. On the other hand, the assurance 
of payment that inherently flows from the autonomy principle in favour of the 
beneficiary exposes both the bank and the applicant to the risk of fraudulent demands 
for payment. Therefore a requirement of excessive strict adherence to the autonomy 
principle would potentially place the buyer in a position without any means of 
                                               
 
4 The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary credits (UCP) are a set of uniform rules issued 
by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), designed to standardise the international banking 
practices relating to documentary credits. In its very nature, the UCP does not have the force of law 
because it is regarded as a general source of law that consist mercantile customs and practices. In 
accordance with article 1, the UCP rules will apply if the parties have expressly agreed to incorporate 
them into their contract. For the purposes of this dissertation, reference will be made to the current 
seventh version, UCP 600, which took effect on 1 July 2007. 
5 See Dynamics Corporation of American v Citizens & Southern National Bank 356 F Supp 991 (ND 
Ga 1973) at 1000.  
6 See Nelson Enonchong The Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees 
(2011) 2. 
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protection against fraud by the beneficiary and ultimately creating a situation that 
conflicts with the general public interest in discouraging the proliferation of fraud.7  
This dissertation focuses on the scope of the fraud exception to the autonomy 
principle in letters of credit. However, judicial authorities dealing with the fraud 
exception in the context of demand guarantees and standby letters of credit will be 
referred to wherever relevant in the dissertation.8 Generally, the position of common 
law courts is that independent guarantees and standby letters of credit stand on a 
similar footing to letters of credit with respect to the autonomy principle, doctrine of 
strict compliance and the fraud exception despite the major differences between the 
two instruments and letters of credit.9 One of the main similarities based on the 
autonomous nature is that independent guarantees and standby letters of credit share 
the legal character of a letter of credit, in the sense that the issuer’s obligation to pay 
is independent of the underlying contract. Based on the similar treatment given to both 
letters of credit and independent guarantees with respect to the fraud exception, the 
dissertation also draws on certain principles in relation to fraud in the context of 
independent guarantees, particularly the approach to the fraud exception as 
demonstrated by the UNCITRAL Convention that relates to Independent Guarantees 
and Standby Letters of Credit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Generally, demand guarantees and standby letters of credit fall under the same family name known as 
independent guarantees since both instruments have the same legal nature and may serve the same 
commercial purpose. 
9 The main difference between letters of credit and independent guarantees can be found in their 
commercial purposes. In the case of a letter of credit, it constitutes a normal mode of payment upon 
performance of commercial obligations on the part of the beneficiary, whereas an independent guarantee 
is designed as a default instrument to provide security to the beneficiary in the event of non-performance 
on the part of the applicant. This means that while the issuer of a letter of credit expects to pay, the 
issuer of an independent guarantee does not normally expect to pay. 
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III The Structure 
The dissertation is composed of seven chapter outlined as follows.  
Following the introduction in Chapter 1 is Chapter 2, which mainly discusses 
the general nature and operational framework of letters of credit. This chapter is mainly 
structured to enable the reader to understand and appreciate the nature, working system 
and fundamental principles of letters of credit.   
Chapter 3 examines the narrow approach taken by the South African courts to 
the fraud exception. This chapter mainly seeks to demonstrate that the current South 
African position is unsatisfactory in the balance it strikes between upholding the 
autonomy principle in letters of credit and preventing the proliferation of fraud.   
Chapter 4 examines the approach of the fraud exception in the case of the English 
law and it also attempts to show similarities in the application of the fraud rule with 
that of the South African law. The main objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that 
the approach of the English courts, like the South African courts is unsatisfactory in 
the balance it strikes between the two competing policy objectives in the context of 
the fraud exception. 
Chapter 5, presents a contrasting position of South African approach to that of 
the American approach, which embraces a more expansive and flexible approach to 
the fraud exception.  The main objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how such an 
approach reflects a better balance between the need to preserve the autonomy of letters 
of credit and the general public interest of combatting fraud. 
Chapter 6 considers the UNCITRAL Convention’s provisions and the balance it 
strikes in the context of the fraud exception. 
Lastly, Chapter 7 contains the conclusions reached with respect to main issues 
discussed in this dissertation and recommendations based on the conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF LETTERS OF CREDIT  
I Introduction 
A letter of credit is generally defined as an undertaking by the bank, at the request of 
its customer (the applicant) or on its own account, to pay a specified amount to the 
beneficiary upon presentation of documents that comply with the requirements of the 
credit.1  The international banking practice relating to letters of credit is standardised 
by the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP). In terms of 
UCP 600, a documentary credit is defined as ‘any arrangement, however named or 
described, that is irrevocable and thereby constitutes a definite undertaking of the 
issuing bank to honour a complying presentation.’2 The fundamental principle that 
governs the letters of credit is that a credit transaction is independent of the underlying 
contract on which it based (‘the autonomy principle’). The courts have recognised the 
essential commercial value of letters of credit as being equivalent to cash in hand.3 
There is, however, one widely accepted exception to the autonomy principle, which 
involves fraud. 
This chapter discusses the general operation framework of letters of credit. Part 
II outlines the parties involved in a letter of credit transaction. Part III looks at the 
series of legal relationships and the respective contractual obligations under a letter of 
credit. Part IV discusses the autonomy principle and its rationale. Part V discusses 
sources of the autonomy principle. Part VI deals with the fraud exception, its rationale, 
the competing interests that underpin the application of the fraud exception and 
different approaches. Part VII contains a summary of the main issues that form the 
subject of the chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
1 See Nelson Enonchong The Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees 
(2011) 7; Andrew Borrowdale ‘Notes and comments: The autonomy rule and the fraud exception in 
documentary credits’ (1982) 99 SALJ 136. 
2 See art 2 of the UCP 600.  
3  Power Curber International v National Bank of Kuwait SAK [1981] 3 All ER 607 at 612. 
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II Parties to the Credit Transaction 
A letter of credit transaction involves a number of parties depending on the existing 
number of inter-banking relationships. The buyer who applies for the credit is known 
as the applicant. The bank that undertakes the issuance of the credit is known as the 
issuing bank. The seller in whose favour the credit is issued is known as the 
beneficiary. The correspondent bank located in the seller’s country that gives 
notification of the opening of the credit is known as the advising bank. Also in certain 
cases the advising bank may assume the role of a confirming bank, if it adds its own 
promise to that of the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary. There may be another bank 
in the seller’s country, known as the nominated bank to which documents are to be 
presented and payment received. 
III Contractual Relationships 
The issuing of a confirmed letter of credit usually involves a series of five separate but 
interconnected contractual relationships. First, the underlying sales contract creates the 
rights and duties between the buyer and seller. Second, the credit agreement between 
the applicant and the issuing bank. Third, a contractual relationship exists between the 
issuing bank and the beneficiary. Fourth, a contract between the issuing bank and the 
bank correspondent bank, which advises or confirms the credit. Fifth, a legal 
relationship exists between the confirming bank and the beneficiary, where the 
correspondent bank also becomes the confirming bank. The above outlined series of 
contractual relationships are discussed in the sections below. 
(a) The Underlying Contract of Sale 
This is a contract entered into between the buyer and seller. The underlying contract 
of sale gives the basis on which a letter of credit is issued. However, this contract is 
separate from and independent of the credit agreement.4 The main purpose of the 
underlying contract to a letter of credit transaction is to stipulate the terms of the credit 
to be opened. Typically, the sales contract should include terms such as a description 
of the goods, the currency, the unit price, and the amount, the method of payment, the 
terms of delivery, and the time period for the shipment and presentation of documents. 
Once the parties have settled on the terms of the sales contract, the buyer assumes 
the obligation to open a letter of credit with the issuing bank. This obligation on the 
                                               
 
4 See art 4 (a) and art 5 of the UCP 600. 
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part of the buyer is regarded as a condition precedent to the shipment of the goods by 
the seller. This principle dictates that the seller assumes no obligation to performance 
of the contract until the letter of credit is opened. The point is well illustrated by 
Denning J in Trans Trust SPRL v Danubia Trading Co Ltd as the following extract 
makes it clear: 
‘…In other cases a contract is concluded and the stipulation for the credit is a 
condition which is an essential term of the contract. In those cases the provision 
of the credit is a condition precedent, not to the formation of the contract, but to 
the obligation of the seller to deliver the goods. If the buyer fails to provide the 
credit, the seller can treat himself as discharged from any further performance of 
the contract and can sue the buyer for damages for not providing the credit.’5 
(b) Relationship between the Applicant and Issuing Bank 
This contract comes into existence when the issuing bank accepts instructions from the 
applicant to open a letter of credit. Generally, the nature of the legal relationship that 
arises from this contract is based on contract of mandate.6 In this case, the issuing bank 
undertakes to perform a mandate or commission for the applicant.7  
In principle, the issuing bank has the following obligations towards the applicant 
(buyer). First, the issuing bank has a duty to issue a credit which complies with the 
buyer’s instructions either by itself or through a nominated bank. Second, it must 
notify the beneficiary of the credit. Failure to fulfil this obligation on the part of the 
issuing bank constitutes a breach of contract with the applicant. Third, the issuing bank 
must examine the documents presented by the beneficiary and honour if they conform 
to the terms of the credit.8 If the bank honours a non-complying presentation, the buyer 
will not be bound to reimburse the bank. In Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson 
Partners Ltd,9 the House of Lords held that the applicant had no obligation to 
reimburse the bank as the bank had not complied strictly with the applicant’s 
instructions. Fourth, the bank must make payment to the beneficiary in accordance 
with terms of the credit.10 Lastly, the bank assumes the duty to adopt a reasonable 
                                               
 
5 [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 348 at 355. 
6 See P Ellinger and D Neo The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit (2010) 84. 
7 See JP Van Niekerk and WG Schulze The South African Law of International Trade: Selected Topics 
3 ed (2011) 282. 
8 Article 14 of the UCP 600. 
9 (1927) 27 L1L Rep 49. 
10 See art 7(b) of the UCP 600. 
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interpretation of ambiguous instruction given by the applicant to the bank. This was 
acknowledged in Midland Bank v Seymour, where the court held that ‘when an agent 
acts upon ambiguous instructions he not in default if he can show that he adopted what 
was a reasonable meaning.’11  
There are three duties which the applicant undertakes to perform towards the 
issuing bank. The first one is the duty to accept from the bank the documents presented 
by the seller provided on their face conform to terms of the credit. Second, the 
applicant must reimburse the issuing bank for the amount paid to the seller. Lastly, the 
applicant has a duty to pay the issuing bank’s charges. 
(c) Relationship between Issuing Bank and Seller 
The issuing of an irrevocable letter of credit constitutes a binding contract between the 
issuing bank and the beneficiary12. This legal relationship comes into being when the 
advising bank provides notification of the credit and upon the receiving of the credit 
by the beneficiary. The issuing bank assumes an obligation to pay the beneficiary upon 
presentation of documents that comply with the terms of the credit and within the time 
period the credit is available.13 If the bank wrongly rejects and refuses to pay against 
documents that comply with the requirements of the credit, the beneficiary can bring 
an action for damages against the bank for breach of contract.14 On the other hand, if 
the beneficiary makes a non-complying presentation and bank decides to refuse to 
honour or negotiate, it must give a notice to the presenter within a reasonable time, not 
exceeding five banking days from the date of receipt of the documents.15 Failure to 
give a notice precludes the bank from claiming that the documents do not constitute a 
complying presentation.16 
The beneficiary has a duty to present documents that comply with the 
requirements of the credit, at the place stipulated in the credit and within the time that 
the credit is available.17 If the beneficiary makes a presentation that does not conform 
to terms of the credit, the bank is entitled to reject them and dishonour. Also where 
                                               
 
11 [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 147 at 153. 
12 Article 7 (b) of the UCP 600. 
13 Article 7 (a) and 6 (e) of the UCP 600. 
14 See Dexters Ltd v Schenker & Co (1923) 14 Lloyd’s Rep 586 at 588. 
15 See art 16 (c) and (d) of the UCP 600. 
16 Article 16 (f) of the UCP 600. 
17 See art 6 (d) (ii) and (e) of  UCP 600. 
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fraud is found on the part of the beneficiary, the bank is entitled to refuse payment 
despite the documents on their face conforming to the requirements of the credit.  
(d) Relationship between Issuing Bank and Correspondent Bank 
This contract comes into existence where the issuing bank gives instructions requiring 
a foreign bank located in the beneficiary’s country to provide specific services. The 
engagement of a correspondent bank offers an advantage to the beneficially to easily 
deal with a local bank rather than another bank in a foreign country.18 The roles of a 
correspondent bank vary namely, advising bank, confirming bank, nominated bank 
and less commonly, a correspondent issuer.19  
The role of the advising bank is to communicate the opening of the credit to the 
beneficiary without any undertaking to honour or negotiate. This arrangement entails 
that the obligation for payment under the credit solely remains on the part of the issuing 
bank. Essentially, the advising bank has two responsibilities towards the beneficiary 
in terms of article 9 (b) of the UCP 600. First, the advising bank has to satisfy itself as 
to the apparent authenticity of the credit. Second, the advising bank has to verify that 
the advice accurately reflects the terms and conditions of the credit. 
The correspondent bank assumes the role of a confirming bank by adding its own 
undertaking to pay the beneficiary provided that complying documents are presented. 
If the credit transaction requires the engagement of a nominated bank, the confirming 
bank is under obligation to reimburse the nominated bank that has received complying 
documents and made payment to the beneficiary.20  
The role of a nominated bank is to receive, examine the documents and pay the 
beneficiary.21 A nominated bank is entitled to reimbursement from the issuing bank or 
confirming bank if it makes payment to the beneficiary against a complying 
presentation of documents.22 One fundamental principle to the undertaking of a 
nominated bank is that unless a nominated bank is the confirming bank, it has no 
                                               
 
18See I Carr International Trade Law 5ed (2014) 439. 
19 The role of the correspondent issuer is outside the scope of this work as it is less common in practice, 
it will not be discussed further. For a detailed discussion, see Ellinger and Neo op cit (n6) 175-177; 
Enonchong op cit (n1) 28. 
20 Article 8(c) of the UCP 600. 
21 Article 12 of the UCP 600. 
22 See art 7(c) and 8(c) of UCP 600 
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undertaking to honour or negotiate, except when expressly agreed to by the nominated 
bank and so communicated to the beneficiary.23 
(e) Relationship between Confirming Bank and Seller 
This contract comes into existence when a correspondent bank in the beneficiary’s 
country confirms a credit. In principle, the confirming bank’s undertaking is in 
addition to, not a substitute for the issuing bank’s undertaking.24 The confirming bank 
undertakes the same obligations towards the beneficiary as does the issuing bank, 
which is primarily to pay the beneficiary against documents that comply with terms 
stipulated under a letter of credit.25 
IV The Autonomy Principle 
The fundamental principle that governs the operation of letters of credit transactions 
is that the payment obligations of the issuing or confirming bank are independent of 
matters arising from the underlying contract. This characteristic of letters of credit is 
known as the autonomy principle. The primary object of the autonomy principle is to 
provide assurance of payment to the beneficiary upon presentation of documents that 
comply with the terms of the credit. Central to the autonomy principle is that the 
obligations of the bank towards the beneficiary are in respect of the documents not in 
respect of the goods. This entails that as long as the documents presented appear on 
their face to conform to the terms of the credit, the bank must pay even though there 
may be disputes involving the performance of the underlying contract.  
The autonomy principle is pivotal to maintaining the efficacy and commercial 
utility of letters of credit. In this regard, the courts have traditionally been reluctant to 
interfere with the autonomy principle. It is long established that the courts will not 
allow the applicant to interrupt payment under a letter of credit on mere allegations 
that the quality of the goods does not conform to the contract of sale.26 Therefore the 
principle behind the operation of letters of credit is often referred to as ‘pay now and 
sue later.’27 In the event of a dispute arising from the underlying contract, the bank 
                                               
 
23 Article 12(a) of the UCP 600. 
24 See Enonchong op cit (n1) 25. 
25 See As part II (c) in this chapter. 
26 See Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146 ; Intraco Ltd v Notis 
Shipping Corporation of Liberia, (The ‘Bhoja Trader’ case); [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 256 Sztejn v Henry 
Schroder Banking Corporation 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941); United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Canada (1983) AC 168. 
27 See Ellinger and Neo op cit (n6)139, Enonchong op cit (n1) 67. 
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must pay and the buyer has an option to seek redress against the beneficiary by 
bringing a separate action. However, the autonomy principle is not immune from the 
fraud exception, which has been widely recognised. 
V Sources of the Principle of Autonomy 
The autonomy principle of letters of credit has been recognised in three broad sources 
namely, the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), statutes 
and case laws. These sources are briefly discussed in the sections below. 
(a) UCP 
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), is a creation of 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which consists a set of uniform 
international contractual rules designed to harmonise the international banking 
practices in relation to documentary credits. However, the UCP does not have a 
binding force of law. This means that it will only apply subject to an express agreement 
between the parties to incorporate the UCP into their contract.28 The UCP provides an 
international recognition of the principle of autonomy that applies to letters of credit. 
Article 4, establishes the autonomy principle on the basis of the independent nature of 
letters of credit from transactions giving rise to it. Article 5 reinforces the principle of 
autonomy on the basis of paper-driven nature of letter of credit, stating that ‘banks deal 
with documents and not with goods, services or performance to which the documents 
may relate.’ 
(b) Case law 
The courts in most common law jurisdiction have long established that to allow 
intervention of payment under a credit would jeopardise certainty of payment 
associated with letters of credit. The sanctity of the principle of autonomy was first 
recognised in the American landmark case of Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking 
Corporation,29 where Shientag J stressed that:  
‘It is well established that a letter of credit is independent of the primary contract 
of sale between the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank agrees to pay upon 
presentation of documents, not goods. This rule is necessary to preserve the 
efficiency of the letter of credit as an instrument for the financing of trade. One 
                                               
 
28 For more details, see (n3) in Chapter 1. 
29 Sztejn supra (n26). 
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of the chief purposes of the letter of credit is to furnish the seller with a ready 
means of obtaining prompt payment for his merchandise.’30 
Under the English law, an early pronouncement of the autonomy principle is found the 
case of in Hamzeh Malas and Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd.31 Jenkins LJ 
expressed the view that a letter of credit transaction ‘imposes upon the banker an 
absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute there may be between the parties 
(to the underlying contract of sale) as to whether the goods are up to a contract or 
not’.32 A not dissimilar view was echoed in Howe Richardson Scale Co Ltd v Polimex-
Cekop and National Westminster Bank Ltd,33 where the court acknowledged that ‘the 
obligation of the bank is to perform that which it is required by that particular 
contract,… that obligation does not depend on the correct resolution of the disputes as 
to the sufficiency of performance by the seller to the buyer or by the buyer to the 
seller.’34 This case concerned a payment under a demand guarantee, however, the 
position in England and in other common law jurisdictions is that demand guarantees 
and letters of credits are treated in a similar manner in relation to the principle of and 
the fraud exception.35 In Power Curber International, where Lord Denning MR, when 
considering the consequences flowing from the autonomous nature of contractual 
undertaking on letters of credit, expressed a view  that ‘[i]t is vital that every bank 
which issues a letter of credit should honour its obligations. The bank is in no way 
concerned with any dispute that the buyer may have with the seller.’36  
In the leading English case of United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd and v 
Royal Bank of Canada,37 Lord Diplock explained, rather eloquently and succinctly, 
that: 
‘The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed irrevocable 
documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the 
seller an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of the goods that 
does not permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract 
                                               
 
30 Ibid at 633-4. 
31 (1958) 2 QB 127.  
32 Ibid at 129. 
33 (1978) 1 Lloyds’s Rep.161. 
34 Ibid at 165. 
35 See Ellinger and Neo op cit (n6) 143. 
36 Power Curber International supra (n3) at 1241. 
37 United City Merchants supra (n26). 
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of sale being used as a ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of 
payment.’38 
(c) Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
In the United States, the autonomy principle is contained in a code, namely, the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) with a similar scope to the provisions of the UCP 
600.39 The primary object of Article 5 is to allow the contracting parties to align the 
contractual terms of their letter of credit in accordance with the provisions of the 
UCP.40  
The autonomous nature of letters of credit is encapsulated in the Revised Article 
5 of the UCC, which expressly states that the issuer’s undertaking under the letter of 
credit is independent of the underlying transaction.  
Article 5-103(d) provides that: 
‘Rights and obligations of an issuer to a beneficiary or to a nominated person 
under a letter of credit are independent of the existence, performance, or non-
performance of a contract or arrangement out of which a letter of credit arises or 
which underlies it, including contracts or arrangements between the issuer and 
the applicant and between the applicant and the beneficiary.’ 
In addition, article 5-108(f) reinforces the principle of autonomy and relevantly 
provides that: 
‘An issuer is not responsible for the performance or non-performance of the 
underlying contract, arrangement, or transaction, an act or omission of others, or 
the observance of or knowledge of the usage of a particular trade other than the 
relevant standard banking practice.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
38 Ibid at 183-4. 
39 See Ellinger and Neo op cit (n6) 54. 
40 Ibid 55. 
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VI The Fraud Exception to the Autonomy Principle 
The inherent assurance of payment derived from the principle of autonomy carries 
with it the risk that the seller may abuse it and defraud the buyer by way of presenting 
fraudulent documents or in the underlying transactions.41 For example, a seller may 
claim that he has shipped goods in accordance with the terms of the contract when in 
actual fact non-conforming goods or no goods at all were shipped, or the bill of lading 
had been backdated to convey the false message that shipment took place within the 
stipulated time.  
In response to resolving the unsatisfactory situation that the beneficiary may 
unjustly benefit from its own fraudulent acts under a letter of credit transaction, 
common law courts established the fraud exception to address the problem of fraud 
and offer the legal protection for the buyers. Jurisprudentially, the American landmark 
case of Sztejn is of significance for Shientag J there provided a classic statement for 
the well-known formulation of the fraud exception, when he proclaimed that ‘the 
principle of the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of credit should 
not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller.’42 The overwhelming rationale for 
the fraud exception is to prevent unscrupulous beneficiaries from benefiting in the 
system.  The fraud exception entitles the buyer by way of obtaining an injunction to 
restrain either the bank from making payment to the beneficiary or the beneficiary 
from receiving payment under a credit. 
Similarly, in the leading English decision of the House of Lords in United City 
Merchants, Lord Diplock articulated, in an often cited passage, the legal basis for the 
fraud exception:  
‘[t]he exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself 
of the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio 
or, if plain English is to be preferred, “fraud unravels all”. The courts will not 
allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud.’43 
This classical dictum has survived the ravages of time, and continues to provide 
the legal justification for the application of the fraud rule under the English law. 
                                               
 
41 See RJ Lee ‘Strict compliance and the fraud exception: Balancing the interests of mercantile traders 
in the modern law of documentary credits’ (2008) 5 MqJBL 137 at 168. 
42 Sztejn supra (n26) at 634. 
43 United City Merchants supra (n26) at 184. Emphasis added. 
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Following the above illuminating statements from both the American and English 
leading decisions, it clear that the courts will not allow a seller to assert the autonomy 
principle in furtherance of an intention to defraud the bank and the buyer. 
Although the fraud exception has been recognised in most common law 
jurisdiction, the courts in various jurisdictions have taken different approaches. The 
resulting situation creates the great concern of uncertainty in the area of the fraud 
exception. For example, the English courts have taken a narrow view of the fraud 
exception, applying it only to cases of fraud in the documents. The South Africa courts, 
like the English courts, have also followed the narrow construction of the fraud 
exception. On the other hand, the courts in the United States have taken a wide 
approach to the fraud exception, which includes both fraud in the documents and fraud 
in the underlying transaction. At the international level, the UNCITRAL Convention 
seem to have adopted the wide approach aimed at preventing unfair or fraudulent calls 
on demand guarantees and stand-by letters of credit.  It is said that although the fraud 
rule has been established to deter the activities of fraudsters, its scope must be carefully 
applied so as not to jeopardise the commercial utility of letters of credit with which the 
prime object is to provide assurance of payment.44  
VII Summary  
Letters of credit play a vital role as a payment mechanism that helps reduce certain 
risks to parties in international trade. The assurance of payment inherent in these 
instruments carries with it the risk of fraudulent demands by unscrupulous 
beneficiaries. The fraud exception was established as a cure to the problem of fraud. 
However, the courts in different common law jurisdictions have adopted different 
approaches. It is observed that a preferable approach to the fraud exception is one that 
strikes a better balance between two poles; the need for protection of the buyer from 
the beneficiary’s fraud against the benefits gained by preserving the letter of credit as 
a commercial instrument and device.45 
                                               
 
44 X Gao and RP Buckley ‘A comparative analysis of the standard of fraud required under the fraud rule 
in letter of credit law’ (2003) 13 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 293.    
45 EL Symons ‘Letters of credit: Fraud, good faith and the basis for injunctive relief’ (1979 -1980) 54 
Tul L Rev 338 at 343. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION 
I Introduction 
Under South African law, the development of the fraud rule has been predominantly 
based on case law. The fraud exception to the principle of autonomy of letters of credit 
has been considered or referred to in a few cases under South African law. The South 
African courts have clearly distinguished between fraud and innocent breach of 
contract.1 In South Africa, as in England, the courts adopted the narrow construction 
of the fraud exception so as to allow the autonomy of letters of credit to be disturbed 
in the least possible of instances. This position is explained by the focus of the courts 
being on the need to preserve the efficacy of documentary credits and the needs of 
international trade.2   
This chapter examines the application of the fraud exception under the South 
law with a view to search for reasons that justify the adopted approach and to find 
possible solutions that may enhance the application of the fraud rule with much more 
flexibility and certainty. The main issues discussed in this chapter lay a foundation for 
a comparative analysis with the approaches to the fraud exception as considered in 
chapter 4, 5, and 6 respectively.3 To facilitate the discussion, this chapter is divided 
into eight main parts outlined as follows. Part II outlines a brief historical development 
of the fraud rule under South Africa law. Part III examines the standard of fraud 
adopted by the courts. Part IV looks at the standard of evidence required for the 
application of the fraud rule. Part V deals with issue of time at which knowledge of 
fraud is relevant both to the bank and the beneficiary. Part VI looks at the concept of 
fraud under South African approach. Part VII discusses the general law of interim 
interdicts. Part VIII contains a summary of the South of the key issues discussed. 
                                               
 
1 JP Van Niekerk and WG Schulze The South African Law of International Trade: Selected Topics 3ed 
(2011) 302. 
2 Loomcraft Fabrics CC v Nedbank Ltd 1996 (1) SA 812 (A) at 816G-817G, the then Appellate Division 
dealt with the disastrous consequences to the international trade if the purpose of letters of credit were 
undermined. See also other South African and English cases cited at 816C-817E. 
3 See S Rodolfo ‘Legal formants: A dynamic approach to comparative law’ (1991) 39 Am J Comp L 1. 
The comparative study of law provides a better understanding not only in achieving uniformity, but also 
whenever ideas, principles or lessons are to be adapted from other foreign legal systems. See also J 
Gordley ‘Comparative legal research: Its function in the development of harmonized law’ (1995) 43 Am 
J Comp L 555.The law of an individual country cannot be thoroughly examined independently of the 
law of others, thus one must look beyond its horizons. 
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II Historical Development of the Fraud Rule 
The first South African case to refer to fraud involving letters of credit was Philips v 
Standard Bank of South Africa.4 In this case the court pronounced the principle that a 
mere breach of the underlying contract by the beneficiary will not entitle the applicant 
to enjoin the payment by way of an interdict against the bank. The case concerned the 
applicants who sought an interdict to restrain the bank from making payment under a 
letter of credit on the ground that a large number of the shoes delivered by an Italian 
manufacturer and exporter were materially defective. The court dismissed the 
application for an interdict on the ground that the applicant had not made out a case of 
fraud. Further, the court held that the allegations made by the applicants were quite 
consistent with an ‘innocent breach of contract.’5 The important outcome of the 
judgement is that the court acknowledged the independence principle of letters of 
credit transactions and made reference to prominent cases in England and the United 
States.6 However, the judgment of the Phillips did not consider in detail the issue of 
the fraud exception as the court expressly refrained from commenting on the extent to 
which, and circumstances under which, it would consider the fraud exception.7  
In Ex parte Sapan Trading (Pty) Ltd,8 the decision of the court clearly illustrated 
the importance of the principle of independence of letters of credit although the facts 
of the case were not directly concerned with the fraud exception.9 The question for 
consideration by the court was whether the applicant would stop payment to the 
beneficiary by way of an attachment order of the beneficiary’s claim against the 
issuing bank in an action intended against the beneficiary. The court cited with 
approval the decision of the Phillips and other leading English cases, which 
acknowledged the principle of independence and stated that the agreement between 
the issuing bank and the beneficiary ‘is separate from, and independent of such 
                                               
 
4 1985 (3) SA 301 (W). 
5  Ibid at 303I–304A. 
6  See ibid at 304D–E.   
7 See A Oelofse The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective (1997) 464; 
Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 302. 
8 1995 (1) SA 218(W). 
9 Oelofse op cit (n7) 465. 
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underlying contracts.’10 The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for an 
attachment order on the basis that plaintiff’s failed to establish a prima facie cause of 
action.  
In Union Carriage v Nedcor Bank Ltd,11 the applicant sought an interdict to restrain 
the beneficiary (Siemens) bank from receiving payment under a standby letter of 
credit. On appeal, the court dismissed the application for an interdict on the ground 
that the applicant had not alleged fraud on the part of the beneficiary. Therefore the 
only question before the court was to determine whether the conditions for effecting 
the payment under a standby letter of credit had been fulfilled. In this regard, the court 
mentioned by way of an obiter dictum that had the beneficiary and the applicant 
entered into an agreement in terms of which the beneficiary undertook not to draw on 
the letter of credit and the beneficiary knowing that it had given such an undertaking, 
nevertheless, sought to extract payment under the letter of credit, it could conceivably 
be guilty of fraud.12 It has been pointed out that the illuminating remarks made by the 
court support the view that the application of the fraud rule is not confined to fraud in 
the documents.13  
The decision of the then Appellate Division in Loomcraft Fabrics CC v Nedbank 
Ltd is of significance in that in that the court provided illuminating guidelines on the 
limitation of the autonomy principle by the fraud exception.14 There, the court had the 
first opportunity to provide the answer to the question concerning the autonomy 
principle and its possible limits in the context of letters of credit. The essential facts in 
Loomcraft were briefly these. Loomcraft, a South African company had contracted to 
purchase a quantity of fabric from Perfel, a Portuguese textile manufacturing company. 
Loomcraft applied to Nedbank to open a letter of credit for deferred payment in favour 
of Perfel. The expiry date of the credit was 18 May 1992 and the latest date for 
shipment was 8 May 1992. The goods arrived in Durban on 18 June 1992 and were 
received by Loomcraft in Johannesburg shortly afterwards. The goods arrived later 
                                               
 
10 Ex Parte Sapan Trading Supra (n8) at 223. Here the court referred to the English judicial authority, 
in particular, the dictum of Griffiths LJ in Power Curber International v National Bank of Kuwait SAK 
[1981] 3 All ER 607 at 614f-g. 
11 1996 CLR 724(W). 
12 Ibid at 735. 
13 See Oelofse op cit (n7) 477; Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 305. 
14 Loomcraft supra (n2). 
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than Loomcraft had expected and it was further dissatisfied with the quality of the 
goods. On 4 August 1992 Loomcraft brought an application in the Witwatersrand 
Local Division for an interdict restraining Nedbank from making payment under the 
letter of credit. It alleged that the transport documents presented to Nedbank contained 
a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the date of shipment. The initial date stamped on 
the documents was 13 May 1992 with additional words reflecting on the documents 
‘actually on board’. Later, it was observed that 13 May was an incorrect date, since 
the goods were received by the carrier on 7 May 1992. The date of issue was then 
corrected to reflect 8 May, but owing to an oversight the words ‘actually on board’ 
were not deleted. Loomcraft’s application was dismissed and it went on appeal. 
On the facts before it, the then Appellate Division found that there appeared to 
be an error, rather than fraud, on the part of the beneficiary.15 Further, it was held that 
mere error, misunderstanding or oversight, however unreasonable, could not constitute 
a case of fraud.16 The court confirmed the widely recognised autonomy principle of 
the letters of credit, and stated that the bank’s liability to honour its undertaking 
towards the beneficiary depended on the presentation of a set of documents that strictly 
conform to the requirements of the credit.17 Furthermore, the court stated that where 
such conforming documents were presented, the bank could not escape its liability to 
pay, except in the most exceptional circumstances, for example, on proof of fraud on 
the part of the beneficiary.18 The court also endorsed a similar view as of the English 
authorities that the beneficiary’s fraud would have to be ‘established clearly’.19 In 
addition, the burden of proof required was the ordinary civil one that had to be 
discharged on a balance of probabilities and, ‘as in any other case where fraud was 
alleged, fraud would not lightly be inferred.’20 With respect to circumstances giving 
rise to the application of the fraud rule, the court stated that a court will grant an 
interdict restraining a bank from paying the beneficiary under a credit in the event that 
                                               
 
15 Ibid 821E. 
16 Ibid at 822G–H. 
17 Ibid at 815H –J. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid at 817G. Here the court endorsed the view that was echoed in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v 
Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 976 (CA) at 171-175. 
20 Ibid. 
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the beneficiary was a party to fraud in relation to the documents presented to the bank 
for payment.21  
In comparison with other authorities previous discussed, the outcome of the 
judgment in Loomcraft bears the following pertinent observations.22 First, it is said 
that the court in reaching its decision closely adopted the narrow view of the fraud 
exception as formulated by English courts.23 Second, no special standard of proof was 
considered on the part of the applicant seeking an interdict to restrain the bank from 
making the payment under a letter of credit. However, it should be noted that the high-
sounding pronouncement that ‘fraud would not lightly be inferred’ appears to have 
practical effect of requiring something substantially more than a mere balance of 
probabilities or a mere prima facie right. This position demonstrates that the question 
on the precise degree of proof is still unsettled under South African law.24 Third, the 
court gave a strong indication that in appropriate cases where the applicant has shown 
the evidence of fraud to the satisfaction of the court, the court will be in a position to 
grant an interdict on the basis of fraud. 
In a more recent case of Casey v First National Bank Ltd,25 the judgment of the 
court of the first instance illustrated the traditional narrow approach, consistent with 
the approach taken in the Loomcraft case, where the decision of the court weighted 
more on the autonomy arguments rather than the prevention of fraud in letters of credit. 
In essence, the question before the court was whether prescription of the underlying 
debt does affect the obligation on the issuing bank to honour the claim presented by 
the beneficiary in accordance with the requirements of the stand-by letter of credit. In 
this case, the applicants alleged that the draw-down claim on the standby letter of credit 
by FirstRand Bank was fraudulent on the ground that debt had prescribed. The court 
of the first instance held that prescription of a debt does not affect enforceability of the 
standby letter of credit, which was dependent only on its own terms for its continued 
                                               
 
21 Ibid at 816A-B and 821G-H. Here the then Appellate Division cited with approval the decision of the 
House of Lords in United City Merchants (Investment) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1982] 2 All ER 
720 (HL) at 725. 
22 See Oelofse op cit (n7) 472; Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 303. 
23 In particular, Lord Diplock’s formulation of the fraud exception in the leading case of United City 
Merchants supra (n21). 
24 See Oelofse op cit (n7) 472. 
25 2013 (4) SA 370 (GSJ). 
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validity.26 On the facts the case, the court dismissed the application on the ground that 
the applicants failed to show proof that the respondent bank had not met the 
requirements for payment claim under the standby letter of credit. Similar to the 
previous cases, the court reiterated the autonomy principle by stating that a standby 
letter of credit similar to all letters of credit ‘is independent from the underlying 
contract…the buyer or borrower cannot go behind the document to stop or suspend the 
payment on the ground of a breach of the underlying contract by the seller,….’27 The 
court also acknowledged the widely recognised concept of the fraud exception as 
established in other judicial authorities that ‘payment would not be permitted in 
circumstances where the beneficiary were a part to a fraud in the documents presented 
to the bank for payment under a letter of credit.’28  
On appeal, the court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the court of the first 
instance and dismissed the appeal in holding that the alleged prescription of the 
underlying debt did not affect the obligation on the issuing bank to honour the claim 
presented by the beneficiary in accordance with the requirements of the irrevocable 
letter of credit, in the absence of fraud.29  
III Standard of Fraud 
The then Appellate Division in Loomcraft adopted the meaning of fraud being material 
representations of fact that to the beneficiary’s or its agents are untrue at the time of 
presenting the documents to the bank.30 The decision of the court in Loomcraft seems 
to follow the House of Lord’s narrow formulation of the exception in the United City 
Merchants case,31 in holding that the only fraud necessary to invoke the fraud 
exception was that of the beneficiary himself or acting through its agents. In this sense, 
the fraud focuses on proof of the beneficiary’s knowledge or intention, thus excluding 
the fraud of a third party. The potential problem arising from this standard is that is an 
inquiry into the beneficiary’s state of mind is not likely to be easy and may require 
extensive investigation.32 Undoubtedly, the burden of proof of the actual knowledge 
                                               
 
26 Ibid at 377E-378B.  
27 Ibid at 375G. 
28 Ibid at 375C-D.  
29 See Casey v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2014 (2) SA 374 (SCA) at 379F-H and 380D-H. 
30 See Loomcraft supra (n2) at 817G–H. 
31 United City Merchants supra (n21) at 725g. 
32 HY Low ‘Confusion and difficulties surrounding the fraud rule in letters of credit: An English 
perspective’ (2011) 17 JIML 462 at 465. 
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results in unfair allocation of risk in favour of the beneficiaries.33 As such therefore, it 
is argued that the scope of the fraud exception should not be confined the requirement 
of actual knowledge of the beneficiary.34 In contrast, the United States under the 
revised Article 5 of the UCC has adopted the standard of fraud that looks more on the 
severity of the effect of fraud on the transaction. 35 It is correctly observed a proper 
standard of fraud is one that is formulated in accordance with the main function of the 
letter of credit; it ensures that neither the seller nor buyer has both cash and goods at 
the same time.36 
IV Evidence of Fraud 
In the Loomcraft case, the then Appellate Division endorsed the view as the English 
courts that the beneficiary’s fraud would have to be established clearly. In addition to 
the showing of a case of clear fraud, the burden of proof required was the ordinary 
civil one, which has to be discharged on a balance of probabilities and, as in any other 
case where fraud is alleged, ‘fraud would not lightly be inferred.’37 However, it has 
been argued that the impressive phrase that ‘fraud would not lightly be inferred’ 
suggests having a practical effect of requiring something more substantial than a mere 
proof on a balance of probabilities.38 This position is open to some doubts on the 
question concerning how much compelling the evidence of fraud must be, still remains 
uncertain under South African law.39 In this regard, the approach adopted by the 
English courts may offer practical guidance. It is generally accepted by the English 
courts that the appropriate test to determine a case of clear fraud is that based on the 
‘material before the court, the only realistic inference is that of fraud.’40 
 
 
 
                                               
 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid. See also Gao op cit (n29) 132. 
35 RP Buckley ‘The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits’ 
(1995) 6 JBFLP 77 at 97. 
36 Comment, ‘Fraud in the transaction: Enjoining letters of credit during the Iranian revolution’ (1980) 
93 Harv L Rev 992 at 1009. 
37 Loomcraft supra (n2) at 817F–G. 
38 See Oelofse op cit (n7) 472; Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 303. 
39 Ibid 480. 
40 See United Trading Corporation SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554 at 561; 
Themehelp Ltd v West and Others [1996] QB 84 and Kvaerner John Brown v Midlands Bank Plc [1998] 
CLC 446. 
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V The Time at Which Knowledge of Fraud Must be proved 
A survey of the South African judicial authorities in which the fraud exception was 
referred to did not deal with the issues concerning the material time at which the fraud 
had to be clear to the beneficiary and the bank. Hence, in the absence of authority on 
this issue, it is likely that the South African courts would align their view similar with 
the English courts.41  
VI The Notion of Fraud: Narrow Sense and Wide Sense 
When dealing the question of where fraud must be located, one has to consider a 
distinction between fraud in the narrow sense and fraud in the wide sense. Fraud in the 
narrow sense relates to documentary fraud, which arises where the beneficiary present 
documents to the bank which contain material false representation. The notion of fraud 
in the wide sense refers to fraud in the underlying transaction, which arises where the 
beneficiary makes a demand for payment when he is not entitled to payment under the 
underlying contract and he has no honest belief that he entitled to payment.42 
The then Appellate Division, in the Loomcraft case, closely followed the narrow 
construction of the fraud exception as formulated by the leading English authority.43 
The court seemed to have recognised the fraud exception to the case where the fraud 
committed by the beneficiary related to documents.44 However, caution is given in 
respect to this conclusion because the facts of the case in Loomcraft concerned only 
alleged fraud in the documents and the applicant did not assert any fraudulent conduct 
on the part of the beneficiary outside the documents.45 Therefore, it is argued that the 
decision of the court in the Loomcraft case cannot be taken as the authority to 
answering the question whether the scope of the fraud exception is confined to fraud 
in the documents or it extends beyond to fraud in the underlying transaction.46 Further, 
it has been pointed out that the fact that the court in Loomcraft referred to the house of 
Lords decision with approval and took it as authority was neither here or there.47 A 
better perspective on this argument is that the Loomcraft case was decided at the time 
                                               
 
41 MK Louw, Selective Legal Aspects of Bank Demand Guarantees (unpublished LLD, University of 
South Africa) (2008) 385. 
42 See United Trading Corporation SA V Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.554 at 559.  
43 See Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 304. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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when the United City Merchants case was still the leading authority and way before 
the recent English authorities were pronounced that dealt with the fraud exception in 
the underlying transaction.48 In the light of this it could lead to another conclusion 
although open to debate, that had the judgment in Loomcraft been handed down after 
the recent English cases, probably the view taken by the then Appellate Division would 
have been different. 
It is argued that the narrow view of the fraud exception is unsustainable with 
regard to the purpose of the fraud rule as well as the public policy aimed at control of 
fraud.49 This is because under the narrow view, the application of the fraud rule is only 
referred to fraud in the documents, whereas fraud in the underlying transaction is does 
not fall within the scope of the exception. As a result, this position creates a loophole 
which may encourage unscrupulous beneficiaries to commit fraud in the underlying 
transaction.50 In this regard, it is correctly observed that a wide approach to the fraud 
exception would be welcomed under South African in keeping with judicial 
developments in other jurisdictions.51 For example, in the United States the fraud 
exception has been expanded to include fraud in the underlying transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
48 Ibid.  
49 X Gao The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (2002) 112. 
50 Ibid. 
51 See Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 305. 
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VII  Fraud and Interdicts  
The South African courts have indicated that an interdict restraining a bank from 
paying under a documentary credit or a beneficiary from receiving payment under a 
letter of credit would only be granted in exceptional circumstances.52 This would 
require the applicant to show proof of fraud on the part of the beneficiary to the 
satisfaction of the court. Although the question concerning the required standard of 
proof of fraud still remains uncertain under South African law, the most probable 
deduction could be that the courts would require the standard of clearly established 
fraud similar to the traditional approach applied by the English courts.53  
Under South African law, an interdict can either be interim or final.54 In the case 
of the former, the applicant will need to meet the following requirements: 
(1) a prima facie right; 
(2) a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not 
granted and the ultimate relief is granted; 
(3) a balance of convenience in favour of the granting of the interim relief; and  
(4) the absence of any other satisfactory remedy  
However, as a matter of principle, the court retains discretionary powers to 
refuse the granting of an interim interdict despite the fact that all the requirements have 
been satisfied.55 The general test for the granting of an interim interdict under the South 
African law is premised on the prima facie right applied together with the balance of 
convenience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
52 See Union Carriage supra (n11) at 732; and Loomcraft supra (n2) at 816 C-D and 817 E-F. 
53 See Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 304. The reason for this deduction stems from the analysis 
of the decision in ZZ Enterprises v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995 CLR 769 (W). Here the 
court mentioned in passing that there would have to be case of ‘clearly established’ fraud to invoke the 
fraud exception. 
54 The focus of this chapter is on interim relief given by courts in the context of a letter of credit, hence 
the discussion will only consider interim interdicts. 
55 See Oelofse op cit (n7) 480. 
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(a) Interdicts against the bank 
There are two reported South African cases where the applicants sought interdicts 
against the bank in the context of letters of credit. In both cases, the applicants were 
unsuccessful in obtaining interdicts to restrain the banks from paying. In Philips,56  the 
court dismissed the application for an interdict on the ground that the facts of the case 
were a mere breach of the underlying contract by the beneficiary. In Loomcraft,57 the 
court stated that the fraud on the part of the beneficiary had to be established clearly 
before an interdict could be issued. In this case the applicant was unsuccessful because 
the court found that fraud was not clearly established. However, in instances where 
fraud is found after the bank has effected payment in good faith, the applicant’s avenue 
of justice lies in a civil action against the beneficiary.58 
(b) Interdicts against the beneficiary 
The first South African case which concerned with the application for an interdict 
against the beneficiary was the Union Carriage case,59 where the applicant was 
unsuccessful in obtaining an interdict against the beneficiary. An important 
observation in the decision of this case is that South African courts are prepared to 
grant such interdicts in appropriate circumstances, but only in the most exceptional 
circumstances.60  
It seems that the difficulties imposed on the applicants of such interdicts under 
South African law are generally similar to the difficulties an applicant would encounter 
under the English law in the context of letters of credit. To date, there are only two 
reported successful English cases and both concerned with performance bonds.61 This 
outcome illustrates the point that although the courts in both jurisdictions apply slightly 
different tests for the application of interim interdicts (interlocutory injunctions under 
the English law), it is especially difficult to obtain an interdict or injunction in the 
context of letters of credit. In contrast, the United States has adopted a more relaxed 
approach that allows the court to issue an injunctive relief even on the basis of 
suspicion of fraud as a means to prevention of fraud. 
                                               
 
56 Philips supra (n4). 
57 Loomcraft supra (n2). 
58 See Van Niekerk and Schulze op cit (n1) 305. 
59 Union Carriage supra (n11). 
60 Ibid at 732. 
61 For example, Themehelp supra (n40) ; Kvaerner supra (n40). 
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VIII Summary  
 The implementation of the fraud rule in South Africa law is still developing due to the 
scarcity of case law in the area of letters of credit fraud. The most logical explanation 
for this position is that in developing countries such a case as South Africa, there is a 
minimal scale of international trade, resulting in little litigation in the law of letters of 
credit.62 Thus, a situation that is different in developed countries where there is more 
considerable level of litigation.63 Because of this position, most of the cases in which 
fraud has been considered, the South African courts have often found guidance from 
international jurisprudence, especially the decisions of the English courts.  
In South Africa, as in England, the courts have highly embraced the narrow view 
of the fraud exception with strict requirements for the application of the fraud rule. 
The main justification for this approach, as revealed by case law is for the purpose of 
preserving the autonomy principle, which in turn advances the needs of international 
commerce. It seems that the South African courts are settled on the beneficiary’s 
knowledge as the standard of fraud rather than an objective standard that directs an 
inquiry into the factual circumstances of the case. So far, there is no authority on the 
point whether fraud in the underlying transaction falls with the fraud exception. Also 
the issue regarding the precise standard of proof is still unsettled under South African 
law.  
Throughout this chapter the relevant case law has illustrated that the South 
African courts’ strict approach to the fraud exception gives more weight on the 
autonomy arguments than the prevention of fraud. It is respectfully argued that such a 
stringent approach can lend a compromise to the effectiveness of the fraud rule.64  
                                               
 
62 See B Maripe ‘The legal aspects of documentary credits in international trade: the case for Botswana’ 
(1997) 30 Comp & Int’l L J S Afr 199. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See Gao op cit (n49) 98. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE APPROACH OF THE ENGLISH COURTS 
I Introduction 
The application of the fraud rule has developed as part of the common law system 
under the English law. Although the fraud exception is recognised in England, the 
courts have applied the fraud rule in a very restrictive way. Generally, the courts have 
imposed a high standard of proof on the plaintiffs requiring them to establish the 
existence of ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ fraud also to the notice of the bank. In addition, the 
balance of convenience should be in favour of granting an injunction. The position of 
the English courts is that the fraud rule will only operate to stop payment in exceptional 
circumstances.1 The reason for maintaining this position is based on two separate but 
related issues; the need to preserve the autonomy principle of letters of credit, which 
provides assurance of payment to the beneficiary and the need to promote international 
trade and the integrity of the banking system.2  
This chapter examines the English courts’ approach to the fraud exception in the 
context of letters of credit. Part II discusses a brief historical development of the fraud 
rule under the English law. Part III examines the standard of fraud adopted by the 
English courts. Part IV looks at the issue of material time at which knowledge of fraud 
is relevant to the bank and the beneficiary. Part V discusses the concept of the fraud 
exception. Part VI examines the standard of proof required in applications for an 
interlocutory injunction and the application of the balance of convenience test. Part 
VII contains a summary of the main issues surrounding the application of the fraud 
under the English law and the way in which it weighs the balance between the 
competing interests that underpin the application of the fraud exception. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
1 See RD Harbottle (Mercantile) v National Westminster Bank  [1978] QB 146.  
2 Ibid at 870.   
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II Historical Development of the Fraud Rule  
The development of the English case law dealing with the fraud exception is based on 
an American case of Sztejn v Henry Schroder Banking Corporation.3 The decision of 
the Sztejn case has been often cited with approval in the English Courts. 
(a) Early cases 
The first English case that considered fraud as an exception to the principle of 
autonomy with the approval of the Sztejn case was Discount Records Ltd v Barclays 
Bank Ltd and Barclays Bank International.4 In this case, the buyer showed evidence 
to the court that not only were the goods delivered later than the stated date on the 
invoice but also the inspection proved that out of the 8,625 records ordered, only 275 
were delivered in accordance with the order and the rest were not as ordered, and were 
either rejects or unsaleable.5 Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of New 
York in Sztejn, the buyer attempted to enjoin the issuing bank from paying on the 
seller's draft, alleging that the seller was guilty of fraud. However, the bank had already 
paid the discounting value of the credit though that was not due at that time.  
Megarry J rejected the buyer's claim, distinguished the case from Sztejn on two 
grounds. First, the court regarded the Sztejn case as a matter of ‘established fraud’. 
However, in this case the court considered that it only involved an allegation of fraud 
and not ‘established fraud’.6 The court reasoned that it would be difficult to resolve 
the fraud issue the seller was not a party to the action.7 Second, the court stated that 
judicial interference should not be invoked in this type of commercial transaction 
unless a ‘sufficiently grave cause’ is shown.8 
The decision of the court in the Discount case illustrated the difficulty of meeting 
the high standard of proof required by the English courts. The criticism against the 
outcome of the judgment is that even though the buyer had obtained evidence in the 
presence of a third party, the issuer, which showed that a large proportion of the 
                                               
 
3 31 NYS 2d 631(1941). 
4 [1975] 1 All ER 1071. 
5 Ibid at 1073. 
6 Ibid at 1074. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid at 1075. 
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shipment was either rubbish or empty cartons, the court held that there was no 
established fraud, but merely an allegation of fraud.9  
Later, the fraud exception was considered in two subsequent cases of RD 
Harbottle v National Westminster Bank and Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays 
Bank International Ltd.10 The two cases concerned disputes of fraud in performance 
bonds. However, the position in England and in other common law jurisdictions is that 
demand guarantees and letters of credits are treated in a similar manner in relation to 
the principle of independence and the fraud exception. In the Harbottle case, the court 
dismissed the interlocutory injunction that had earlier been granted to restrain the 
banks from paying as it was found that there was no established fraud. The facts of the 
case that were relevant to fraud were briefly as follows. The English plaintiffs 
concluded a sale contract with Egyptian buyers. In the contract it provided that the 
plaintiffs should establish a guarantee confirmed by a bank in favour of the buyers. 
The plaintiffs contended that the buyers had demanded payment under guarantee 
without justification. This claim was rejected by the court in a key passage referring 
to the fraud exception, as Kerr LJ articulated the matter in this way: 
‘It is only in exceptional cases that the court will interfere with the machinery of 
irrevocable obligations assumed by banks. They are the life-blood of international 
commerce. Such obligations are regarded as collateral to the underlying rights 
and obligations between the merchants at either end of the banking chain. Except 
possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, the courts will 
leave the merchants to settle their disputes under the contract by litigation or 
arbitration….The courts are not concerned with their difficulties to enforce such 
claims: these are risks which the merchants take. In this case, the Plaintiffs took 
the risk of the unconditional wording of the guarantees. The machinery and 
commitment of banks are on a different level. They must be allowed to be 
honoured, free from interference by the Court. Otherwise, trust and international 
commerce would be irreparably damaged.’11 
The court reaffirmed the importance of the independence principle of letters of 
credit transactions and stated that the court will enjoin the bank except in clear cases 
                                               
 
9 X Gao The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (2002) 49-50. 
10 Harbottle supra (n1); [1978] 1 QB 159. 
11 Harbottle supra (n1) at 155-156. 
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of fraud of which the banks have notice.12 Also the decision of the court illustrated the 
reasons for the narrow construction of the fraud exception and unwillingness of the 
English courts to meddle in international commerce. Thus the narrow ambit of fraud 
is generally justified on grounds of commercial efficacy or ‘life-blood of commerce’.13  
In Edward Owen Engineering, a seller sought an interlocutory injunction to 
enjoin its bank from paying a Libyan bank that had issued a performance bond in 
favour of the buyer in Libya. The seller alleged that the buyer’s demand for payment 
under the bond was fraudulent and it was to the knowledge of both the English and 
Libyan banks. The Court of Appeal endorsed the view of the court in the Harbottle 
case and discharged an interlocutory injunction that had earlier been granted to restrain 
the banks from paying under a performance bond as the court found that there was no 
established fraud. Accordingly, in the judgment delivered by Denning MR with whom 
other members of the court agreed, the applicant must show ‘clear fraud of which the 
bank has notice’,14 that a claim of fraud must be ‘very clearly established’15 and that it 
must be ‘clear and obvious to the bank’16 that the beneficiary had been guilty of fraud. 
(b) The leading case: United City Merchants 
The leading English authority that provided some light on the parameters of both the 
autonomy principle and the fraud exception is the decision of the House of Lords in 
United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada.17 The question for 
consideration was whether fraud by a third party of which the beneficiary was unaware 
would fall with the scope of the fraud exception. The facts of the case relevant to fraud 
were briefly as follows. In 1975, Glass Fibres and Equipment Ltd, an English company 
entered into a contract selling glass fibre making equipment to a Peruvian company 
named Vitrorefuerzos SA (Vitro). Payment was to be made by an irrevocable letter of 
credit issued by the Banco Continental SA of Peru and confirmed by the Royal Bank 
of Canada. Glass Fibres and Equipment Ltd assigned their rights, entitlements and 
benefits under the credit to United City Merchants, and notice of the assignment was 
                                               
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid at 171. 
15 Ibid at 173 (Browne LJ). 
16 Ibid at 175 (Lane LJ). 
17 [1983] AC 168 (HL). 
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given to the banks. The contract provided that the goods had to be shipped on or before 
15 December 1976. However, an employee of the forwarder fraudulently predated the 
bill of lading to 15 December 1976 when shipment had actually been made on 16 
December 1976. On presentation of the documents, the confirming bank refused to 
pay because it became aware the shipment had not been made as shown on the bill of 
lading. Before the court was the question whether the bank is entitled to refuse to pay 
against documents that apparently conform on their face, but where the goods had not 
been shipped within the time period stipulated in the sale contract.  
The court of the first instance held that the defendant bank was not entitled to 
refuse payment under the credit on the ground of fraud committed by a third party. The 
trial court’s decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeal in holding that 
the applicant’s mandate to the bank was to pay against genuine documents, and 
therefore that the bank would be would be entitled to refuse paying against forged 
documents. Further, it was held that the fact that the fraud had been committed by a 
third party could not prevent the bank from raising the defence of fraud against the 
beneficiary. In this sense, Ackner LJ expressed a view which has much to commend 
it, that ‘it is the character of the document that decides whether it is a conforming 
document and not its origin.’18 It is should be noted that the decision of the Court of 
Appeal was centred on the nature of the documents irrespective of the perpetrator of 
fraud. The decision of the House of Lords is not left without criticism, as observed by 
one eminent academic, Professor RM Goode, ‘a fraudulently completed bill of lading 
does not become a conforming document merely because the fraud is that of a third 
party.’19 Another prominent commentator describes the decision of the House of Lords 
in this way: 
‘English law, however, appears to protect shrewd sellers who utilise the services 
of third parties discreet enough to keep their fraudulent practises to themselves. 
The law in effect encourages sellers not to inquire into the details of the activities 
of third parties involved in their transactions so long as the bills of lading appear 
valid, for any knowledge of wrongdoing would jeopardise the sellers’ chances of 
being paid. A bank which receives firm evidence external to the documents of 
                                               
 
18 [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 604 at 628- 629. 
19 RM Goode ‘Reflections on letters of credit – I’ (1980) JBL 291 at 294. 
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fraud by a third party does not even have the option of refusing to honour a credit 
governed by English law as stated in the American Accord.’20 
When the case went to the House of Lords, it reversed the decision of the Court 
of Appeal and upheld the decision of the court of first instance. The House of Lords 
reiterated the importance of the autonomy principle and held that the fraud exception 
did not extend to fraud by a third party. Lord Diplock first described the autonomous 
nature of the documentary credit that the parties to it “deal in documents not in goods” 
and emphasised that disputes as to the goods are irrelevant to the seller’s rights to 
payment.21 His Lordship went on and recognised the fraud exception and stated:  
‘To this general statement of principle as to the contractual obligations of the 
confirming bank and the seller, there is one established exception:  that is, where 
the seller for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the 
confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material 
representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue.’22    
Lord Diplock further explained the legal basis of the fraud exception in the 
following often quoted passage that has survived the ravages of time: 
‘The exception for fraud on the part of the beneficiary seeking to avail himself of 
the credit is a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio or, if 
plain English is to be preferred, “fraud unravels all”. The Courts will not allow 
their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry out a fraud.’23 
On the facts of the case, the House of Lords held that the fraud exception did not 
apply as the beneficiary was an innocent party and genuinely believed the goods have 
been shipped as required under the credit. Further, it was held that the bank, which had 
confirmed the credit, was bound to pay on tender of the backdated bill. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
20 GW Smith ‘Irrevocable letters of credit and third party fraud: The American Accord’ (1983 -1984) 
24 Va J Int’l L 55 at 70-71. 
21 United City Merchants supra (n20) at 182-183. 
22 Ibid at 183. 
23 Ibid 183-4. 
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III The Standard of Fraud  
Under the English law, the beneficiary’s knowledge or intention seems to have been 
settled as the standard of fraud to invoke the fraud rule. Thus the fraud exception 
applies where there is representation of facts untrue to the knowledge of the presenter 
of the documents. The leading case on point is the decision of the House of Lords in 
United City Merchants. In accordance with Lord Diplock’s formulation, the meaning 
of fraud consists of the following elements.24 First, the documents must contain, 
expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that are untrue. Second, 
the beneficiary must fraudulently present documents for the purpose of drawing on the 
credit with the knowledge of such untruth. 
Following the leading decision, there appears two propositions to be drawn in 
respect to the beneficiary’s knowledge that falls within the fraud exception.25 The first 
scenario is where the document created and presented by beneficiary and contains a 
material statement that is untrue. The second scenario is where the beneficiary, before 
presenting a document created by a third party, the beneficiary had knowledge that it 
contained a material false representation he will be guilty of fraud. However, it is 
observed that the problem with the standard of intentional fraud is that the degree of 
knowledge of fraud is primarily based on an inquiry into actual knowledge rather than 
constructive knowledge.26   
In addition to the requirement of the beneficiary’s knowledge, the element of 
material false representation is also required for the application of the fraud exception. 
Thus fraud arises where there exists sufficient evidence of a false statement made in a 
document.27 However, it is observed that the decision of the House of Lords in the 
United City Merchant case provides very little light on the meaning of the word 
‘material’ representation of fact.28 With regards to the issue of materiality, Lord 
Diplock put the matter in this way: 
‘The answer to the question: “to what must be misstatement in the documents be 
material?” should be: “material to the price which the goods to which the 
                                               
 
24 Ibid at 183G. 
25 See P Ellinger and D Neo The Law and Practice of Documentary Letters of Credit (2010) 142. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See R Goode Commercial Law 3ed (2004) 991. 
28 See Ellinger and Neo op cit (n26) 141; Nelson Enonchong The Independence Principle of Letters of 
Credit and Demand Guarantees (2011) 104-105. 
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documents relate would fetch on sale if, failing reimbursement by the buyer, the 
bank should be driven to realise its security”.’29 
It is suggested that the word ‘material’ means material to the bank’s duty to pay, so 
that if the documents stated the truth the bank would be obliged and entitled to reject 
the documents.30 For example, in the United City Merchants case itself, if the bill of 
lading reflected the correct date of shipment, it would have been outside the credit 
period.31 It is respectfully pointed out that this interpretation offer a far better statement 
of the principle even though it seems to be contrary to Lord Diplock’s judgment, which 
is out of step with the wider law and the practice of letters of credit.32 
IV Time at which knowledge of fraud must be apparent 
When considering the application of the fraud exception, it is essential to establish the 
relevant time at which fraud must be clear both to the beneficiary and the bank. The 
relevant time for the beneficiary’s knowledge of fraud is the time of presentation. It is 
to be noted that if the beneficiary becomes aware of the falsity of the document after 
presentation, his claim to payment cannot be defeated. In Group Josi Re v Wallbrook 
Insurance,33 Staughton LJ observed that: 
‘It is nothing to the point that at the time of trial the beneficiary knows, and the 
bank knows, that the documents presented under the letter of credit were not 
truthful in material respect. It is the time of presentation that is critical.’34 
The question concerning the relevant time at which fraud must be clear to the 
bank may arise in two different situations. First, if the bank has already paid on the 
credit and the applicant is refusing reimbursement. Secondly, if the bank has not paid 
out and is resisting proceedings by the beneficiary for payment under the credit. In the 
first situation, a bank that honours a presentation without requisite knowledge of the 
beneficiary’s fraud is entitled to reimbursement. This principle was acknowledged in 
Credit Agricole Indosuez v Generale Bank,35 where the negotiating bank which had 
paid the beneficiary claimed reimbursement from the issuing bank. Further, it was 
stated that the fraud has to be clear to the knowledge of the bank at the time of 
                                               
 
29 United City Merchants supra (n17) at 186. 
30 See A Malek and D Quest Jack: Documentary Credits 4ed (2009) 254. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Gao op cit (n9) 89. 
33 [1996] 1 WRL 1152 
34 Ibid  at 1161. 
35 [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 1009. 
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payment.36 In United Trading Corporation SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd,37 it was held 
that it is not open to contest that an applicant can rely on evidence of fraud not apparent 
to the bank at the time of payment. 
In the second situation, if fraud is clear at the time of presenting the documents 
then the bank is entitled to refuse payment and it has a defence to a claim by the 
beneficiary. The most crucial issue has been whether the bank that has in the first place 
rejected the documents on the ground of non-conformity can later rely on the new 
evidence of fraud to its notice after the date of payment but before the time of the 
hearing. In Balfour Beatty Civil Engineering v Technical and General Guarantee Co 
Ltd,38 the court observed the ‘absurdity’ that would result if judgment is entered against 
the bank because the evidence of fraud was not available to the bank at the time of 
payment.39 In Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank,40 the court held that the 
availability of the bank’s defence does not depend on whether evidence of fraud is 
made available before or after time of presentation.41 Here the decision of the court 
relied on the principle that the court should not lend its process to assist fraud. It seems 
that the more recent English decisions support the view that the bank can adduce the 
evidence necessary to establish fraud at whatever stage in the proceedings prior to the 
hearing.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
36 Ibid at 1015. 
37 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.554 at 560. 
38 [1999] 68 Con LR 180. 
39 Ibid at 189. 
40 [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.911. 
41 See the subsequent trial in Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2004] EWHC 1938 (Comm) at 
209. 
42 See Safa Ltd v Banque du Caire [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600 (CA); Solo Industries UK Ltd v Canara 
Bank [2001] 1 WLR 1800. 
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V The Notion of Fraud:  Narrow Sense and Wide Sense 
When dealing with the issue of the fraud exception the misrepresentation is either in 
the documents presented to the bank or in the underlying transaction. However, it is 
still unsettled among the English courts as to whether the exception extends beyond 
fraud in the documents to fraud the underlying transaction.43  
(a) Fraud in the documents 
In the leading English case of United City Merchants, Lord Diplock stated that the 
exception refereed to documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material 
representation of fact that to the beneficiary’s knowledge are untrue.44 This seems to 
suggest that the fraud exception is confined to fraud in the documents themselves.45 
However, it is observed that it is not clear as to whether his Lordship referred to 
documentary fraud in relation in light of the facts of the case or he confined the fraud 
exception to documents only.46 The decision of the House of Lords did not settle the 
question whether the exception extends to fraud in the underlying transaction.   
(b) Fraud in the underlying transaction 
Fraud in the underlying transaction arises where the documents tendered by the 
beneficiary are truthful but there is fraud in the transaction on which the credit is based. 
As pointed out in the above section, there is no English case authority that expressly 
decides the point whether the exception extends to fraud in the underlying transaction 
in the context of letters of credit.47 However, it is argued that Lord Diplock’s maxim 
that ‘the courts will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest person to carry 
out a fraud’ appears to indicate the exception extends to fraud in the underlying 
transaction.48 Also viewing it from the policy consideration that the fraud exception 
was established to prevent unscrupulous beneficiary from benefiting from his own 
fraudulent acts, it would seem to have sound justification in extending the fraud 
                                               
 
43 See Malek and Quest op cit (n30) 254.  
44 United City Merchants supra (n17) at 183- 4. 
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underlying transaction. For example, in Themehelp v West [1996] QB 84, where fraud in the underlying 
transaction was deemed sufficient to support the application of the fraud exception. Also in Solo 
Industries supra (n42), where the bank succeeded in its defence that the performance bond was voidable 
on the ground that the bank was induced to issue by fraud on the part of the beneficiary. 
48 Horowitz op cit (n45) 25. 
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exception to fraud in the underlying transaction rather than limiting it to fraud in the 
documents.49  
VI Interlocutory Injunctions and Standard of Evidence  
The English courts generally require a high standard of proof to succeed in proceedings 
dealing with the fraud exception. However, English courts have made distinction 
between the standard of evidence required to obtain an interlocutory injunction and the 
evidence necessary to entitle a bank to refuse to pay in proceedings under a summary 
judgment. In the former case, where an applicant may seek an interlocutory injunction 
either against the bank or beneficiary, it is a requirement that the fraud must be 
‘established’ or compelling. In a case involving proceedings against the bank by the 
beneficiary in a summary judgment, all that a bank has to show is either the ‘real 
prospect of successes or ‘established fraud’ depending on the locus of the beneficiary’s 
fraudulent acts. 
A party who alleges fraud may seek an application for an interlocutory injunction 
to restrain a bank from making payment under a credit or a beneficiary from receiving 
payment. The general guiding principles of the standard proof required for an 
interlocutory injunction were set out in the decision by the House of Lords in American 
Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd.50 The test formulated is whether there is a ‘serious 
question to be tried’.51 This is generally to be understood that the court had to be 
satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious.52  
(a) Injunctions against the bank 
The issue concerning the fraud exception is like to arise primarily where the applicant 
seeks an injunction to stop the bank from making payment under a letter of credit. The 
result of the high standard of proof required of the plaintiff in order to convince the 
courts to grant an injunction on the basis of the fraud exception is that such injunctions 
are extremely difficult to obtain.  
The difficulty of meeting this high standard of proof is illustrated in a number of 
cases. The case of Discount Records is one of the first reported English cases to 
consider the issue of when an interlocutory injunction could be granted to restrain a 
                                               
 
49See Ellinger and Neo op cit (n25) 143. 
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51 Ibid at 407. 
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bank to pay under a credit where there the beneficiary had been fraudulent.53 The 
applicant had clearly shown that not only were the goods delivered later than the stated 
on the invoice, but there was also evidence that 97 per cent of the goods delivered were 
not as ordered and were either rejects or unsaleable. Nevertheless, the court decided 
not to grant an injunction on the ground that there was no established fraud but merely 
an allegation of fraud.54  
Later, a similar issue came up for decision in two subsequent cases involving 
performance bonds. In the Harbottle case,55 the court rejected an interlocutory 
injunction that had earlier been granted to stop certain banks from paying under some 
performance bonds as the court found that there was no established fraud. Kerr J 
expressed the view that injunctions should not be granted ‘[e]except possibly in clear 
cases of fraud of which the banks have notice.’56 A similar view was reaffirmed by the 
Court of Appeal in the Edward Owen Engineering case,57 where the court discharged 
an interlocutory injunction that had been granted to restrain a bank from paying under 
a performance bond. The members of the court emphasised that the applicant must 
show ‘clear fraud of which the bank has notice’.58 On the facts of the case, the Court 
of Appeal held that the requirements of the fraud exception had not been met, payment 
could not be enjoined. In Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank, the Court of 
Appeal stated that ‘…the evidence must be clear, both to the fact of fraud and as to the 
bank’s knowledge.’59  
It is to be noted that the English courts in the preceding cases did not seem 
concerned that insisting on a high standard of established fraud was not in accordance 
with a lower threshold test set in the American Cyanamid case. Later, in United 
Trading,60 the court formulated a more precise test, which was in accordance with the 
American Cyanamid principles. The standard of proof of fraud adopted was that a 
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‘seriously arguable case that the only realistic inference is fraud’.61 The following 
extract from Ackner LJ’s judgment warrants particular attention: 
‘We would expect the court to require strong corroborative evidence of the 
allegation, usually in form of contemporary documents, particularly those 
emanating from the buyer. In general, for the evidence of fraud to be clear, we 
would also expect the buyer to have been given an opportunity to answer the 
allegation and to have failed to provide any, or any adequate answer in 
circumstances where one could properly be expected. If the court considers that 
on the material before it the only realistic inference to draw is that of fraud, then 
the seller would have made out a sufficient case of fraud.’62 
However, it is to be noted that in terms of the United Trading standard, it is not 
merely sufficient for the plaintiff to show a seriously arguable case. This was 
illustrated by the outcome of the case, where the Court of Appeal refused to grant 
injunction on the ground that even though the plaintiff succeeded in establishing a 
seriously arguable case that there is good reason to suspect that the demands on the 
performance bonds were not made honestly, they did not establish a good arguable 
case that the only realistic inference was fraud.63 Ackner LJ went on and cautioned 
that insisting on a high standard of ‘established fraud’ was overly restrictive and that 
being the case, ‘impressive and high-sounding phrases such as “fraud unravels all” 
would become meaningless.’64 He expressed his concern in light of the purpose for 
which the fraud exception was established. 
In the context of letters of credit there are only a few English cases in which the 
applicant had succeeded in establishing fraud to the satisfaction of the court although 
injunctions were not granted based on the balance of convenience or other justifiable 
grounds. For instance, in Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc,65 where a demand 
for payment on a letter of credit was made with the support of a receipt bearing a forged 
signature. The applicant had successfully met the high standard of proof of which the 
court was convinced of the forgery and the bank’s knowledge. However, the court 
refused to grant an injunction considering that it was not necessary since the bank had 
                                               
 
61 Ibid at 561. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at 565. 
64 Ibid. 
65 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 171. 
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already twice rejected the demand and it was not going to pay out on the credit anyway. 
In Czarnikow Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd,66 the court 
refused to grant an application to stop the bank from paying under letters of credit on 
the ground of the balance of convenience. Nevertheless, there was no objection by the 
court that such a fraud would fall outside the scope of the fraud exception. 
(b) Injunctions against the beneficiary 
Where the applicant considers that the beneficiary has made a fraudulent call on the 
letter of credit, the applicant may seek an injunction to restrain the beneficiary from 
receiving payment. However, there are a handful of cases in which the applicant had 
sought an injunction targeted at the beneficiary. It is to be noted that these cases were 
decided on the United Trading standard of a ‘serious arguable case that on the material 
available the only realistic inference is fraud’. 
In Group Josi Re v Walbrook Insurance,67 a case concerned with an interlocutory 
injunction against the beneficiary to restrain a demand for payment under a letter of 
credit, it was alleged by the applicant that the underlying contract was voidable on the 
ground of fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the beneficiaries. The Court of 
Appeal rejected the applicant’s claim on the ground that there was no sufficient 
evidence of misrepresentation to avoid the underlying reinsurance contracts. 
So far under the English law, injunctions have been granted in two rare cases, 
which both involved performance bonds rather than letters of credit. An injunction was 
granted in Themehelp,68 where the sellers of the business were fraudulent in relation 
to the sale share agreement by withholding financial information in their possession 
from the buyers. An injunction was also granted in Kvaerner John Brown v Midlands 
Bank Plc,69 where a beneficiary under a performance bond presented a certificate that 
written notice of default had been served on the applicant when in fact it had not done 
so.  
 
 
 
                                               
 
66 [1999] 2 Lloyds’s Rep 187. 
67Group Josi supra (n33). 
68 Themehelp supra (n47). 
69 [1998] CLC 446. 
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(c) Balance of convenience test 
Under the English law, an interlocutory injunction will not be granted unless the 
applicant can, in addition to evidence of fraud, also satisfy the balance of convenience 
test. The balance of convenience test was considered in detail in the American 
Cyanamid case,70 according to which the court has to determine whether one party 
bears the risk of being prejudiced in the event that an injunction is granted. The test 
requires consideration whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the 
applicant. In arriving at this conclusion, the court would need to weigh a number of 
factors for the granting or refusal of an injunction, taking into consideration of the 
harm to the plaintiff as compared to the harm to the defendant. It is pointed out that 
the test seems to offer an extra benefit to the banks because the test is usually weighted 
against the beneficiary.71 Therefore this position indicates that even if the applicant 
succeeds in showing sufficient evidence of fraud, an injunction against the bank is 
likely to fail on the ground that damages will an adequate remedy for any breach of 
duty by the bank.72  
In Harbottle, Kerr J affirmatively stated that: 
‘if the threatened payment is in breach of contract, then the plaintiffs would have 
good claims for damages against the bank. ... [t]he balance of convenience would 
in that event be hopelessly weighted against the bank.’73  
In Czarnikow,74 the Court refused to grant an injunction against the bank on the 
ground of the balance of convenience. The court took the view that where the court 
has at its disposal other means of protecting the defrauded claimant by way of Mareva 
relief, then ‘the public and general interests in maintenance of the banking 
commitments and in the autonomy of such commitments’ would always tip the balance 
against granting an injunction.75 The decision of the court illustrated the position that 
the courts would have to consider the position of the bank in determining the balance 
of convenience. 
 
                                               
 
70 American Cyanamid supra (n50). 
71 HY Low ‘Confusion and difficulties surrounding the fraud rule in letters of credit: An English 
perspective’ (2011) 17 JIML 462 at 465. 
72 Malek and Quest op cit (n30) 281. 
73 Harbottle supra (n1) at 155. 
74 [1999] 2 Lloyds’s Rep 187. 
75 Ibid 203-204. 
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VII Summary  
Traditionally, the English courts’ approach to the fraud exception is more weighted on 
upholding the autonomy principle and the needs of trade than the need for prevention 
of fraud. In England, the courts will require the beneficiary’s knowledge of fraud to 
invoke the fraud rule. Additionally, the crucial time for the determining the 
beneficiary’s knowledge of the fraud is at the time of presentation and where there is 
lack of such knowledge on the part of the beneficiary the fraud exception would not 
apply. The granting of an interlocutory injunction would require the applicant to show 
proof of clear or obvious fraud. In the context of letters of credit, the issue regarding 
whether the scope of fraud exception extend includes the fraud in the documents or it 
extends to fraud in the underlying transaction is still unsettled under the English law.  
Although the English courts have for a long time espoused the narrow view of 
the fraud for the purposes of preserving the autonomy principle and promoting the 
needs of international trade, their adopted narrow approach restricts the fraud 
exception to the extent of defeating the purpose for which the exception was 
established.76 
  
                                               
 
76 See Gao op cit (n1) 50; Low op cit (n72) 462. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE POSITION IN THE UNITED STATES 
I Introduction 
In the United States, the fraud rule was recognised much earlier than other common 
law jurisdictions, as the fraud exception was first originated in America. The United 
States has a statutory legislation that contains provisions for the fraud issue in letters 
of credit, which is called the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The comprehensive 
regulation of letters of credit is embodied in the Revised Article 5 of the UCC of the 
1995 version, which offers the courts a more relaxed approach to the exception. The 
United States’ approach to the fraud exception is a standard specially designed to 
prevent proliferation of fraud in letters of credit1. The standard of fraud adopted under 
the Revised Article 5 of the UCC is that of ‘material fraud’. Additionally, Article 5 of 
the UCC has adopted a wider view of fraud which refers to both fraud in the documents 
and fraud in the underlying transaction and it should be established. In terms of the 
Revised Article 5, the fraud rule could apply in two different situations either by the 
issuing banks might choose to dishonour the credit or the applicant may seek an 
injunction to enjoin the payment or presentation.  
This chapter examines the United States approach to the fraud exception in the 
context of letters of credit. Part II discusses a brief historical development of the fraud 
rule in the United States. Part III examines the adopted standard of fraud in terms of 
the Revised Article 5 of the UCC. Part IV looks at the concept of the fraud exception. 
Part V discusses the general law of injunctive relief and the required standard of proof. 
Part VI contains a summary of the key issues pertinent to the application of the fraud 
rule in the United States and the way in which it weighs the balance between the 
competing interests that underpin the application of the fraud exception. 
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II A Brief Historical Development of the Fraud Exception 
(a) The Landmark Sztejn decision 
The United States case of Sztejn v Henry Schroder Banking Corporation is widely 
recognised as the foundational authority on the fraud exception.2 In this landmark case, 
the Supreme Court of New York County held that the issuing bank could properly 
refuse to pay and the applicant could properly obtain an injunctive relief where the 
documents, though partially complying, represented worthless material and rubbish. 
The relevant facts of the case briefly were as follows. Sztejn (Buyer) contracted to 
purchase hog bristles from Transea Traders Ltd (Seller), an Indian company. The buyer 
applied for an irrevocable letter of credit to be issued by J Henry Schroder Banking 
Corporation in favour of the seller. Transea Traders Ltd loaded fifty cases of material 
on board a steamship and secured a bill of lading and the invoices. The Chartered bank 
located at Cawnpore, India, was the correspondent bank. Transea Traders Ltd 
delivered the required documents to Chartered bank. Before payment had been made 
to the Chartered bank by Schroder, Sztejn applied for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
alleging that the beneficiary had in fact filled the fifty crates with ‘cowhair, other 
worthless material and rubbish with intent to stimulate genuine merchandise and 
defraud the plaintiff.’3  
Shientag J first reiterated the importance of the autonomy principle: 
‘It is well established that a letter of credit is independent of the primary contract 
of sale between the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank agrees to pay upon 
presentation of documents, not goods. This rule is necessary to preserve the 
efficiency of the letter of credit as an instrument for the financing of trade.’4 
He went on and explained the generally accepted non-judicial interference with 
the bank’s independent payment obligations under a credit. The following extract is 
pertinent: 
‘It would be a most unfortunate interference with business transactions if a bank 
before honoring drafts drawn upon it was obliged or even allowed to go behind 
the documents, at the request of the buyer and enter into controversies between 
the buyer and the seller regarding the quality of the merchandise shipped.’5 
                                               
 
2 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941). 
3 Ibid at 633. 
4 Ibid at 633.  
5 Ibid.  
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On the facts of the case before the court , Shientag J distinguished the case as 
one involving ‘intentional fraud’ by the beneficiary, and appropriately noted the case 
was not ‘a mere breach of warranty’.6 The court came to a conclusion that in such a 
situation where the seller is fraudulent, ‘the principle of the independence of the bank's 
obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous 
seller’.7 It was further established by the court that enjoining payment to a beneficiary 
who has substituted the merchandise ‘not merely inferior in quality but consists of 
worthless rubbish caused no hardship’ upon any party to the letter of credit.8 
It is to be noted that the court in the Sztejn case did not enjoin payment solely 
out of consideration for the applicant but also in the interest of the issuing bank’s 
security. Thus the issuing bank would suffer losses from the beneficiary’s fraud, if the 
applicant failed to reimburse the bank after making payment under a letter of credit, 
leaving it with worthless rubbish. In such a case, Shientag J addressed the matter in 
this way: 
‘While the primary factor in the issuance of the letter of credit is the credit 
standing of the buyer, the security afforded by the merchandise is also taken into 
account. In fact, the letter of credit requires a bill of lading made out to the order 
of the bank and not the buyer. Although the bank is not interested in the exact 
detailed performance of the sales contract, it is vitally interested in assuring itself 
that there are some goods represented by the documents.’9 
The decision of the court in the Sztejn case is of significance in that it laid down 
three paramount principles.10 First, payment under a letter of credit may only be 
interrupted in a case of fraud, thus a mere allegation of breach of warranty is not a 
valid defence warranting judicial interference to payment. Secondly, payment under a 
letter of credit can only be interrupted where fraud is established; in this case a mere 
allegation of fraud should not be an excuse for such an interruption. Thirdly, payment 
should be made according to the terms of the credit, regardless of the existence of 
                                               
 
6 Ibid at 634. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid at 635. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See RP Buckley and X Gao ‘The development of the fraud rule in letter of credit law: The journey so 
far and the road ahead’ (2002) 23 U Pa J Int’l Econ L 663 at 680. 
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established fraud, if demand for payment is made by a holder in due course or a 
presenter in similar status. 
Although the Sztejn case is regarded as the foundation stone in the development 
of the exception, its shortcomings are that the court did not consider other pertinent 
issues such as the burden of proof and the standard of fraud required to invoke the 
fraud rule.11 
(b) The Prior UCC Article 5 
The principles set out in the Sztejn case were first codified into Article 5 of the prior 
UCC of 1962 version. This legislation demonstrated a very important step towards the 
harmonisation and unification of the fraud rule in the law governing the letters of 
credit.12 Furthermore, the codification of the Sztejn decision into a statute strengthened 
the position of law of the fraud rule involving letters of credit.13 
The UCC Article 5, section 5-114(2) codified the Sztejn decision by providing that: 
(2)  ‘Unless otherwise agreed, when documents appear on their face to comply 
with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform 
to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title 
(Section 7-507) or of a certificated security (Section 8-306)  or is forged or 
fraudulent in the transaction: 
(a) the issuer must honour the draft or demand for payment if honour is 
demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand 
which has taken the draft or demand under the credit and under 
circumstances which would make it a holder in due course (Section 3-
302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a 
document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 7-507) or a bona 
fide purchaser of the certificated security (Section 8-302); and  
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith 
may honour the draft or demand for payment despite notification from 
the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face 
of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin 
such honour.’ 
It is observed that the prior UCC Article 5 was a restatement of the Sztejn 
principles, which merely existed as draft for future development of the fraud rule.14 
This is because the legislation did not cast any light on the standard of fraud necessary 
to trigger the fraud rule and whether the rule should extend to fraud in the underlying 
contract. This led to a number of proposed standards by the courts in the application 
of the fraud exception in light of provisions under the first Article 5 of the UCC. The 
                                               
 
11 Gao op cit (n1) 42.  
12 Ibid 44. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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position under the prior UCC Article 5 led the courts to adopt different approaches to 
determine the standard of fraud to invoke the fraud exception, for example, ‘egregious 
fraud’,15 ‘intentional fraud’,16 ‘flexible standard’17 and ‘a broader constructive 
approach’.18  
(c) The Revised UCC Article 5 
Although the prior UCC Article 5 demonstrated a significant step in the development 
and unification of the fraud rule, its application was still far from certainty. It left some 
issues unanswered and unregulated, which led to confusion among courts and the 
parties involved in letters of credit.19 Following this uncertainty, Article 5, section 5-
114(2) of the UCC was redrafted. The section now encapsulating the fraud exception 
is section 5-109 of 1995 version. The pertinent issues addressed by the Revised Article 
5 including the following. The codification of the fraud exception has been amended 
to read that a court may enjoin payment under a letter of credit if ‘a required document 
is forged or materially fraudulent, or honour of the presentation would facilitate a 
material fraud.20 The Official Comment on section 5-109 has given an indication that 
‘material fraud’ requires that the fraudulent aspect of a document be material to the 
purchaser of that document or the fraudulent acts be significant to the participants in 
the underlying transaction.21. This further requires that the courts must examine the 
underlying transaction, when fraud is alleged in order to reach a conclusion whether a 
document is fraudulent to a material extent.22 Secondly, the Official Comment sets out 
that fraud refers to both fraud in the documents and in the underlying transaction.  
                                               
 
15 See Intraworld Industries Inc v Girard Trust Bank 336 A 2d 316 (1975). Generally, the egregious 
standard of fraud refers to situations in which ‘the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has so vitiated the 
entire transaction that the legitimate purposes of the independence of the issuer’s obligation would no 
longer be served’ (at 324-325). See also New York Life Insurance Co v Hartford National Bank & Trust 
Co 378 A 2d 562 (Conn SC 1977).  
16 See NMC Enterprises Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System Inc 14 UCC Rep Serv 1427 (1974). An 
injunction was granted to restrain the bank from paying under a letter of credit on the basis of fraud in 
the underlying transaction.  
17 See United Bank Ltd v Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp 392 NYS 2d 265 (1976). The New York 
Court of Appeal established that the flexibility standard lies between ‘a breach of warranty and outright 
fraudulent practice’ (at 271).  
18 See Dynamics Corp of America v Citizens & Southern National Bank 356 F Supp 991 (1973). The 
court formulated a standard that included any conduct of the beneficiary which involves ‘a breach of a 
legal or equitable duty’ (at 998-999). However, threshold of this standard is too low and could lend the 
fraud rule to a risk of abuse as a defence to payment. 
19 Gao op cit (n1) 44. 
20 Revised UCC Article 5, sec 5-109 (a). 
21 Official Comment to Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, para 2. 
22 Ibid.  
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III The Standard of Fraud 
The position under the Revised UCC Article 5, section 5-109 requires the standard of 
‘material fraud’ for application of the fraud exception. Unlike the Prior UCC Article 
5, the Revised UCC Article 5 seems to have adopted a unique standard of fraud that 
avoids the use of extreme concepts of fraud such egregious and constructive fraud.23 
Although the Revised Article 5 of the UCC states that fraud must be proven to be 
‘material’, it does not provide a clear definition of what material means.24 Instead, the 
Official Comment on Section 109 provides an explanation as to the nature of 
fraudulent action that constitutes material to the other party.25 
The fraud issue has arisen in the courts since the promulgation of the Revised 
UCC Article 5. In the context of letters of credit, the position of the Revised Article 5 
of the UCC had been considered in a recent case of Mid-America Tire v PTZ Trading 
Ltd Import and Export Agent.26 In this case, the appellate court interpreted ‘material 
fraud’ within the meaning of ‘fraud egregious’ where the demand for payment under 
the letter of credit ‘has absolutely no basis in fact’.27 The facts were briefly that a 
dispute arose out of extensive negotiations for the purchase of Michelin tires by Mid-
American Tire and Jenco from PTZ Trading Ltd through agents of PTZ, financed by 
a letter of credit. During the negotiations period, PTZ’s agents made specific 
representations to the buyers concerning the quality, quantity and the price of the tires. 
When the agreement was concluded, the quality, quantity and the price of tires all 
failed to conform to what had been promised. The buyers sought an injunction to 
prevent payment under a letter of credit. The trial court granted an injunction on the 
ground that the seller’s agents had made material misrepresentations to the buyers. 
When the case went for appeal, the majority judgment reversed the decision of 
the trial court. The question before the appellate court was ‘how should “material 
fraud”…be interpreted’? The court reached a conclusion that material fraud ‘must be 
narrowly limited to situations of fraud in which ‘the wrongdoing of the beneficiary 
                                               
 
23 Gao op cit (n1) 99.  
24 Ibid 84. 
25 Official Comment to Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, para 2. 
26 43 UCC Rep Serv. 2d 964 (Ohio App.2002). 
27 See similar approach first in taken in Ground Air Transfer v Westate’s Airlines 899 F 2d 1269, 1272-
73 (1st Cir. 1990); New Orleans Brass v Whitney  National Bank and The Louisiana Stadium and 
Exposition District 2002 LA. App. LEXIS 1764 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002). 
 50 
 
has…vitiated the entire transaction… and /or the demand for payment under a letter of 
credit ‘has absolutely no basis in fact.’28 
IV The Notion of Fraud: Narrow Sense and Wide Sense 
The Prior UCC Article 5 did not provide a clear guide as to whether the court should 
only be allowed to investigate fraud in the documents or it should also be allowed to 
look to the underlying transaction. The controversy originated from the different 
interpretations of the language of section 5-114(2) which provided that the fraud rule 
should be applied ‘when …a required document …is forged or fraudulent or there is 
fraud in the transaction.’ The phrase ‘fraud in the transaction’ led to an open question 
among both the courts and the commentators as to whether it meant only the credit 
transaction per se or also included the underlying transaction as well. The majority of 
the courts and commentators favoured the broader view of fraud, which encompass 
the underlying transaction.29 Proponents of the broader approach took Sztejn as the 
authority as fraud was established in the underlying transaction because the buyer 
would ultimately receive rubbish instead of the contracted goods.30 However, some 
courts and commentators argued that the phrase of section 5-114(2) should be read 
narrowly so as to give effect to the application of the fraud rule only to situations where 
the beneficiary presented false documents to the issuing bank or where fraud is found 
in the credit transaction.31 The main justification advanced in favour of the narrow 
approach is that the Sztejn case involved fraud in the transaction as the documents 
presented had a misrepresentation of the underlying transaction.32 
The Revised UCC Article 5 provided a solution that addressed the uncertainty 
regarding the ambit of the fraud exception, expressly including fraud in the underlying 
transaction within the scope of the fraud exception. The language of the Revised UCC 
Article 5, section 5-109 reads that a court of a court may enjoin payment under a letter 
of credit if ‘a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honour of the 
                                               
 
28 Citing the standard which was established in Intraworld supra (n15) at 324-325. 
29 For example, cases that support the broader view of fraud: NMC Enterprises supra (n16); Intraworld 
supra (n15) ; United Bank supra (n17). 
30 F Monteiro ‘Documentary credits: The autonomy principle and the fraud exception: A comparative 
analysis of common law approaches and suggestions for New Zealand’ (2007) 13 Auckland U L Rev 
144 at 155. 
31 For example, cases that support the narrow view of fraud: Bossier Bank and Trust Co v Union Planters 
National Bank 550 F 2d 1077 (1977); O’Grady v First Union National Bank 250 SE 2d 587 (1978). 
32 Monteiro op cit (n30) at 154-155. 
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presentation would facilitate a material fraud.’33 In contrast with the language of the 
prior UCC Article 5, section 5-114(2), section 5-109 had changed the phrase ‘fraud in 
the transaction’ into ‘honour of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud’. The 
newly adopted language of the Revised UCC Article 5 clearly settled the issued that 
relief is available when fraud is established in the underlying transaction. Furthermore, 
the position of section 5-109 is reinforced by the Official Comment 1, which reads: 
‘The courts must examine the underlying transaction when there is an allegation 
of fraud, for only by examining that transaction can one determine whether a 
document is fraudulent or the beneficiary has committed fraud, and, if so, whether 
the fraud was material.’34 
Thus the courts the United States are settled that fraud in the underlying 
transaction falls within the scope of the fraud exception. The United States position is 
mainly focused on the prevention of fraud unlike the English courts who are persuaded 
by the need to protect the efficacy of documentary credits and the needs of trade.35 
V Fraud and Injunctive Relief 
Under the Revised UCC article 5 the fraud rule could apply into two different 
situations either the issuing banks may choose to dishonour the credit or the applicant 
may obtain an injunction to enjoin the payment or presentation. In a case of the second 
situation, the code stipulates four requirements that must be met when a court considers 
the granting of a relief in favour of the applicant on the basis of fraud.  
Section 5-109 provides that: 
(b) ‘if an applicant claims that a required document is forged or materially 
fraudulent or that honour of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud 
by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction 
may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from honouring a 
presentation or grant similar relief against the issuer or other persons on if the 
court find that 
(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable to an accepted draft 
or deferred obligation incurred by the issuer; 
                                               
 
33 Revised UCC Article 5, sec 5-109 (a). 
34 Para 2. 
35 Monteiro op cit (n31) 157. 
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(2) a beneficiary , issuer, or nominated person who may be adversely affected 
is adequately protected against loss that it may suffer because the relief is 
granted; 
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief under the law of this 
State have been met; and  
(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is 
more likely than not to succeed under its claim of forgery or material fraud 
and the person demanding honour does not qualify for protection under 
subsection 1(a).’36 
It has been said that the above requirements have been set out for the purpose of 
minimising the frequency with which the fraud rule has been applied beginning the 
period of the late 1970s and, at the same time, it indicates that the standard for 
injunctive relief is high in terms of the Revised UCC article 5.37 The United States 
position, unlike the English courts, seems to have made no distinction between the 
evidence required to obtain an interlocutory injunction and the evidence necessary to 
entitle a bank that has refused to justify its refusal in proceedings against it.38 This 
observation draws its inference from the language of the Official Comment 5 on the 
Revised UCC Article 5, section 5-109, relevantly provides that: 
‘Although the statute deals principally with injunctions against honour, it also 
cautions against granting ‘similar relief’ and the same principles apply when the 
applicant or issuer attempts to achieve the same legal outcome by injunction 
against presentation…interpleader, declaratory judgment, or attachment.’ 
However, the Revised Article 5 of the UCC seems to have adopted a more 
flexible approach in that courts are allowed to grant interim injunctions on the basis of 
strong suspicion of fraud and does not require proof of the beneficiary’s knowledge of 
fraud. 
 
                                               
 
36 Revised UCC Article 5, sec 5-109(a)(1) provides a list of four parties immune from fraud: (i) a 
nominated person who has given value in good faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud; 
(ii) a confirmer who has honoured its confirmation in good faith; (iii) a holder in due course of a draft 
drawn under a letter of credit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person and; 
(iv) an assignee of the issuer’s nominated person’s deferred obligation that was taken for value and 
without notice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the issuer or nominated 
person. 
37 See Gao op cit (n1) 47. 
38 Ibid 51. 
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(a) General requirements for interim injunctions 
In the United States, an applicant seeking an injunction will, in addition to proving 
material fraud on the part of the beneficiary, also have to show that:  
(1) irreparable injury and  
(2) either a probable success on the merits or  
(3) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground 
for litigation and a balance of hardships weighing in favour of the applicant.39 
The above requirements are consistent with the Revised UCC Article 5, section 
5-109(b) (3), which provides that ‘all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief 
under the law of this State have been met.’ 
VI Summary  
In the United States, letters of credit are regulated by a comprehensive statutory 
legislation called the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The UCC originated as an 
inspiration of the decision of the landmark Sztejn case. The Revised Article 5 of the 
UCC (1995 version) has adopted material fraud as the standard of fraud. This standard 
focuses on effect of the severity of fraud rather than on the intention of the fraudster. 
However, the precise meaning of the standard of material fraud has not been so certain 
despite some clarity found in recent case law. This is because ‘material’ is understood 
be a general term. The revised article 5 has also adopted a wide approach, which 
includes fraud in the underlying transaction. In addition, the United States approach is 
more relaxed in that it allows the courts to issue interim injunctions in appropriate 
circumstances as way of preventing fraud.  
The flexible approach adopted by the United States is said to be specially 
designed to combat fraud in letters of credit, which demonstrates a substantial balance 
between the autonomy principle and the need for prevention of fraud. 
 
                                               
 
39 See, for example, American Bell International Inc v The Islamic Republic of Iran 474 F Supp 420 
(SDNY 1979); United Technologies Corporation v Citibank NA 469 F Supp 473 (1979). 
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CHAPTER 6 LESSONS FROM THE UNCITRAL CONVENTION  
I Introduction 
The United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of 
Credit (the UNICTRAL Convention) is a creation of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNICTRAL), which was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1995.1 The most significant feature of the 
Convention is the treatment given to circumstances where there are allegations of fraud 
or abuse in demand for payment in undertakings. It is to be noted that the Convention 
avoids the use of the word fraud, instead the heading phrase of Article 19 ‘exceptions 
to payment obligation’ parallel the accepted fraud exception.2 Similar to the United 
States, the Convention has also adopted a wide view of the fraud exception which 
includes fraud in the underlying transaction. The Convention contains detailed 
examples of types of misconducts that can invoke the fraud rule. In addition, the 
Convection affirms the entitlement of the applicant to the provisional court measures 
to block payment in accordance with Article 20.  
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the provisions of the fraud rule in the 
Convention that may serve as useful guidelines to enhancing the application of the 
fraud rule by the national courts, including South Africa. Part II examines the standard 
of fraud, the detailed examples of fraudulent conducts and the provisional court 
measures as remedy to the applicant in circumstances where fraud is found to be 
committed by the beneficiary. Part III highlights the significant lessons to be drawn 
from the Convention in the context of the fraud exception. Part IV assesses the 
shortcomings of the Convention in relation to its sphere of application. Part V contains 
a summary of the key issues discussed under this chapter. 
  
                                               
 
1 For further details, see (n1) in chapter 1. 
2 A Davidson ‘Fraud; the prime exception to the autonomy principle in letters of credit’ (2003) 8 Int'l 
Trade & Bus L Ann 23 at 51. 
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II Provisions Relevant to the Fraud Issue 
The risk of fraud and abusive demand is detrimental to the integrity of the undertaking 
and consequently hampers the commercial viability of the undertaking. In response to 
resolve such problems, the Convention expressly states its main purpose: 
‘a main purpose of the Convention is to establish greater uniformity 
internationally in the manner in which guarantor/issuers and courts respond to 
allegations of fraud or abuse in demands for payment under independent 
guarantees and stand-by letters of credit… The Convention helps to ameliorate 
the problem by providing an internationally agreed general definition of the types 
of situations in which an exception to the obligation to pay against a facially 
compliant demand would be justified.’3 
In terms of Article 15, the Convention provides a general requirement for the 
beneficiary demanding payment under a standby letter of credit or Independent 
guarantee. Article 15(3) provides that ‘[t]he beneficiary, when demanding payment, is 
deemed to certify that the demand is not in bad faith and that none of the elements 
referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph (1) of Article 19 are present.’ 
This is suggests that there is room to give effect to disrupt payment if the elements 
listed in Article 19 constitute the demand.4 Article 19 provides for circumstances under 
which the guarantor or issuer may refuse payment and also enables the applicant to 
take appropriate court measures against a fraudulent beneficiary. Article 20 provides 
for measures available to the applicant in such a case where there is strong evidence 
of fraud on the part of the beneficiary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
3 See paras 45 and 46 of the explanatory note by the UNICITRAL secretariat. 
4 X Gao The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (2002) 61. 
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(a) Exception to payment obligations 
Article 19 contains exceptions to payment obligations, which are intended to deal with 
specific instances and acts. It is observed with merit that such an approach is to be 
welcomed in light of divergent judicial opinions expressed by different jurisdictions.5 
Furthermore, Article 19 is a reflection of fact patterns established in different legal 
systems by notions such as ‘fraud’ or ‘abuse of right’.6 Article 19 encompasses three 
circumstances in which the guarantor or issuer, acting in good faith is entitled to the 
right not pay out to the beneficiary.  
(1) ‘If it is manifest and clear that: 
(a) Any document is not genuine or has been falsified; 
(b) No payment is due on the basis asserted in the demand and the supporting 
documents; or 
(c) Judging by the type and purpose of the undertaking, the demand has no 
conceivable basis, the guarantor/issuer, acting in good faith, has a right, 
as against the beneficiary, to withhold payment.’ 
There are two pertinent observations with respect to the formulation of the 
second and third exception outlined above.7 The second exception generally covers the 
literal defences, thus defences that are available and originate from the text of the 
guarantee / stand-by letter of credit of which the bank can deploy against the 
beneficiary. The third exception consists of a general formulation of fraud considering 
that different jurisdictions have used various descriptions (such as fraud, abuse of right, 
manifestly unreasonable demand) for the circumstances under which it is possible to 
reject payment under a guarantee / stand-by letter of credit. 
Furthermore, for the purpose of clarity on the stated exceptions, paragraph (2) of 
Article 19 gives illustrations of situations in which a demand is deemed to have ‘no 
conceivable basis’: 
(a) ‘the contingency or risk against the undertaking was designed to secure the 
beneficiary has undoubtedly not materialized; 
                                               
 
5 Davidson op cit (n1) at 51. 
6 Ibid. See also F De Ly, ‘The UN Convention on independent guarantees and stand-by letters of credit’ 
(1999) 33 Int'l Lawyer 831 at 842. 
7 De Ly op cit (n6) at 842. 
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(b) the underlying obligation of the principal/ applicant has been declared invalid 
by a court or arbitral tribunal, unless the undertaking indicates that such 
contingency falls within the risk to be covered by the undertaking; 
(c) the underlying obligation has undoubtedly been fulfilled to the satisfaction of 
the beneficiary; 
(d) fulfilment of the underlying obligation has clearly been prevented by wilful 
misconduct of the beneficiary; 
(e) in the case of a demand under a counter-guarantee, the beneficiary of the 
counter-guarantee has made payment in bad faith as guarantor/issuer of the 
undertaking to which the counter-guarantee.’ 
(b) Provisional measures 
Article 20 spells out provisional court measures and respective conditions that may be 
available to the applicant where the demand for payment is made under the exceptions 
listed in Article 19(1) (a), (b) and (c). In addition, the Convention requires the applicant 
to show proof of such abusive circumstances on the basis of immediately available 
strong evidence.  
Article 20 relevantly provides that: 
(1) ‘Where, on an application by the principal / applicant or the instructing 
party, it is shown that there is a high probability that, with regard to a 
demand made, or expected to be made, by the beneficiary , one of the 
circumstances referred to in subparagraphs of (a), (b) and (c) of 
paragraph (1) of Article 19 is present , the court on the basis of 
immediately available strong evidence , may: 
(a) Issue a provisional order to the effect that the beneficiary does 
not receive payment, including an order that the guarantor / 
issuer hold the amount of the undertaking, or  
(b) Issue a provisional court order to the effect that the proceeds of 
the undertaking to the beneficiary are blocked, taking into 
account whether in the absence of such an order the principal / 
applicant would be likely to suffer serious harm. 
(2) The court, when issuing a provisional order referred to in paragraph (1) 
of this article, may require the person applying therefore to furnish such 
form of security as the court deems appropriate. 
(3) The court may not issue a provisional order of the kind referred to in 
paragraph (1) of this article based on any objection to payment other 
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than those referred to in subparagraphs of (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 
(1) of Article 19, or use of the undertaking for a criminal purpose.’ 
III Significant Lessons from the UNCITRAL Convention 
The UNCITRAL Convention contains clear and detailed provisions that touch the 
issue of fraud. These provisions can to a large extent provide good guidance to the 
courts on their application of the fraud rule.8 Most importantly, the Convention may 
be regarded as an inspiration to the development of the fraud rule under the national 
legal systems in the following areas.  
First, the Convention clearly provided that the standard of fraud that may invoke 
the application of the fraud rule is that fraud must be ‘clear and manifest’.9 Along with 
this standard of fraud, the Convention provides a detailed list of misconducts acts 
necessary to trigger the fraud rule.10  
Second, the Convention expressly states the actions to be taken by victims of 
fraud that in circumstances where fraud is ‘manifest and clear’, such as the issuer’s has 
a right against the beneficiary to withhold payment,11 and the applicant’s entitlement 
to a provisional court order to stop the issuer from paying out.12  
Third, the Convention seems to taken a wider approach which brings fraud in 
the underlying transaction within the scope of the fraud exception.13  
Fourth, article 20 of the Convention provides the necessary actions to be taken 
by courts when determining the application of the fraud rule. 
Fifth, the Convention requires ‘strong evidence’ as the standard of proof 
misconduct.14 However, it does not state that the intention of the wrongdoer must be 
proven, taking a similar approach to the United States approach but contrary to the 
English approach as well as the South African approach. 
Lastly, it is observed that the approach adopted in Article 19 of the Convention 
reflects a balance between the competing interests and considerations of the parties 
involved.15 On one hand, the Convention gives the guarantor/ issuer a right and not a 
                                               
 
8 Gao op cit (n4) 97. 
9 Article 19(1) of the UNCITRAL Convention.  
10 Ibid subparagraph (a), (b) and (c). 
11 Ibid. 
12 See art 19(3) of the  
13 See Article 19(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the UNCITRALConvention. 
14 See art 20(1) of the UNCITRAL Convention. 
15 Davidson op cit (n1) at 53. 
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duty to withhold payment. This position is aimed at preserving the commercial 
reliability of undertakings as promises that are independent from the underlying 
transactions.16 On the other hand, the Convention recognises the rights of the 
principal/applicant arising from the circumstances set out under Article 19, and it 
expressly states that the principal /applicant is entitled to provisional court measures 
to block payment.17 
IV Drawbacks of the Convention  
Although the Convention is characterised by an international posture as the instrument 
that contains detailed provisions with respect to the issue of fraud, it has some gaps 
particularly in the context of letter of letters of credit.  
First, the Convention directly applies to stand-by letters of credit and 
independent guarantees, as such the narrow scope of application weakens its sphere of 
influence at international level.18 However, its application in the context of letters of 
credit is left as a matter of choice if parties wish to do so.19 Second, it falls short of one 
broad element of the fraud rule that requires identification of innocent third parties 
which are immune from fraud.20 Third, it is pointed out that the Convention fraud rules 
are defensible on the part of the banks and beneficiaries and toothless from the 
applicant’s perspective.21 This point is demonstrated by the Convention in the sense 
that it does not place an obligation on the bank to notify the applicant and delay the 
payment in a situation where the applicant has not yet obtained a legal remedy to stop 
the payment immediately.22 Lastly, unlike the UCP rules, which have to be 
incorporated into the letter of credit as contractual terms to be effective, the parties to 
a letter of credit can only incorporate the provisions of the Convention if their countries 
are contracting member states and have ratified the Convention for it to take effect. 
 
 
 
                                               
 
16 The Official Explanatory Note to the Convention Para 48. 
17 Article 19(3) of the UNCITRAL Convention. 
18 Gao op cit (n1) 63. 
19 See art 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Convention. 
20 Gao op cit (n1) 63. 
21 DE Ly op cit (n6) at 845. 
22 Ibid. 
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V Summary  
Despite the narrow scope of application, the UNCITRAL Convention approach to 
prevention of fraud demonstrates that it is in accordance with judicial developments in 
other jurisdictions, in particular the United States. It is observed that the detailed 
provisions of the Convention can offer practical guidance to national courts on the 
application of the fraud rule with much more certainty.23  
The Conventions seems to strike a balance of the competing interests of the 
parties involved by maintaining a principle that payment still remains as rule while 
setting out exceptions in circumstances where a demand for payment is fraudulent or 
unjustified.  
  
                                               
 
23 Gao op cit (n1) 97. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I General Conclusions 
Letters of credit are regarded as a useful payment mechanism that reduces the risk 
concerns of both the seller and buyer through increased level of predictability and 
security in international trade.1 The efficacy and commercial utility of letters of credit 
is derived from the autonomy principle, which insulates the credit transaction from 
extraneous matters arising from the underlying transaction. The prime object of this 
principle is to guarantee quick and reliable payment to the seller. However, the 
assurance of payment inherent in the usage of letters of credit carries with it the risk 
of fraudulent demands by unscrupulous beneficiaries for monetary gains. The problem 
of fraud has been described as ‘a cancer in international trade’.2 In response to this 
undesirable situation, an exception to the autonomy principle has been established as 
a means to offer legal protection for the buyer against fraudsters. From the policy 
consideration standpoint, the application of the fraud rule requires striking an 
appropriate balance between the competing interests of preserving the autonomy 
principle and deterrence of fraud in letters of credit system. The underlying concern is 
that any deviation from the original purpose of the fraud exception may dilute the 
autonomy principle and consequently undermine the commercial utility of letters 
credit.3   
Although the fraud exception has been widely recognised, the courts in different 
jurisdiction have adopted different approaches even within common law jurisdictions. 
This position stems from the fact that the standard of fraud is difficult to define.4 
This dissertation sought to demonstrate how the current South African position 
is unsatisfactory in the balance it strikes between the need for protection of the 
autonomy principle and combating fraud. As alluded to earlier in chapter 2, the 
application of the fraud rule under the South African is heavily centred on preserving 
the autonomy principle as the courts take into consideration the prime object of this 
principle is to provide assurance of payment to the seller.  
                                               
 
1 Leacock, SJ ‘Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment of Letters of Credit in 
International Transactions’ (1984) 17 Vanderbilt J Trans’ L 885 at 886. 
2 Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 684 at 686. 
3 X Gao The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Study (2002) 63. 
4 Ibid 98. 
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From the comparative perspective, the South African courts’ approach to the 
fraud exception is very similar to the English courts’ approach in a number of areas of 
the law relating to the development of the fraud rule, except in minor respects such as 
the test for the standard of proof. First, like the English courts, the South African courts 
seem to have embraced the strict approach with high standard, requiring the 
beneficiary’s knowledge or intent as the standard of fraud. Therefore the fraud 
exception does not extend to fraud committed by a third party of which the beneficiary 
has no knowledge. Second, the then Appellate Division in the Loomcraft case seemed 
to have recognised the fraud exception to fraud in the documents. However, as pointed 
out earlier in chapter 3, the judgment of the Loomcraft case was based on alleged fraud 
in the documents, and as such it cannot be regarded as the authority in determining the 
question whether the fraud exception extends to fraud in the underlying transaction. 
So far, there is no authority on this issue. Nevertheless, the remarkable obiter dictum 
made in other relevant authorities provides an indication the South African courts will 
recognise fraud in the underlying transaction as a valid exception to the autonomy 
principle of letters of credit.5 Third, both jurisdictions require a clear case of 
established fraud on the part of the beneficiary for the purposes of granting an interdict 
(injunction). Fourth, in both jurisdictions the standard of proof required is the ordinary 
civil one which has to be discharged on a balance of probabilities. However, the crucial 
issue concerning how much more compelling the evidence must be still remains 
unsettled under South African law.6  
The narrow construction of the fraud exception favoured by the English courts 
was the subject of Chapter 4. The rationalisation for the narrow approach is explained 
by the need to preserve the autonomy principle of letters of credit and maintain the 
certainty of payment. From the autonomy view point, banks deal exclusively with 
documents, and thus the only kind of fraud a bank is entitled to consider as a defence 
to payment is that which is clear on the face of documents. The leading case on this 
point is the decision of the House of Lords United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Canada,7 which seem to have confined the exception to fraud in the 
documents. However, recent decisions have also seem to have accept that fraud in the 
                                               
 
5 See Union Carriage v Nedcor Bank Ltd 1996 CLR 724(W) at 735. 
6 See A, Oelofse The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective (1997) 480. 
7 [1983] AC 168 (HL). 
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underlying transaction especially in demand guarantees falls within the scope of the 
exception.8 Generally, the English courts have been overly restrictive in the application 
of the fraud exception, requiring the applicants to show proof of ‘clear or obvious 
fraud’ to the knowledge of the beneficiary at the time of presentation of documents. 
Also the bank’s knowledge of fraud at the time of payment is a crucial element in an 
action where the applicant is refusing reimbursement against the issuing bank. 
However, in accordance with the current practice, the general accepted formulation for 
the standard of proof in an interlocutory injunction is that based on the ‘material 
available before the court, the only realistic inference is that of fraud.’9 Additionally, 
the evidence of fraud must be immediately available without the need for lengthy and 
extensive investigation into the underlying contract.  
As demonstrated in this dissertation, although the narrow view of the fraud 
exception mainly seeks to protect the autonomy principle, such arguments are not 
always commercially sustainable as it may unfairly allocate the risk in favour of the 
beneficiary and it may encourage unscrupulous beneficiaries to commit fraud in the 
underlying transaction.  
The wide and flexible approach to the fraud exception favoured by the United 
States has been considered in Chapter 5. Unlike the English and South African courts 
which are impressed by the autonomy arguments and the needs of trade, the United 
States courts have adopted a wide approach to the fraud exception that seems to be 
justified by the need to prevent the proliferation of fraud, particularly fraud in the 
underlying transaction.  
In the United States, the fraud comprehensive regulation of the fraud rule is 
codified in the Revised Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Section 5-
109 of Article 5 spells out material fraud as the standard being required for the 
application of the fraud rule. In contrast to both the English and South African courts, 
the standard of ‘material fraud’ does not focus on the intention of the beneficiary but 
rather on the objective examination of the circumstances of the case to determine 
whether fraud has been committed. It has been observed that the United States court’s 
objective approach of looking at the factual circumstances of the case and not 
                                               
 
8 See Themehelp Ltd v West and Others[1996] QB 8; Kvaerner John Brown v Midlands Bank Plc [1998] 
CLC 446. 
9 See United Trading Corporation SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554 at 561. 
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investigating into the beneficiary’s state of mind is an indirect extension of the third 
party fraud with the scope of the fraud exception.10 In this regard, the UCC takes a 
position similar to the UNCITRAL Convention which is more weighted on the nature 
of the documents, not the identity of the fraudulent party.11  In addition, the United 
States position has widely defined the fraud exception to include the fraud in the 
underlying transaction. it is also worth noting that the Revised Article 5 of the UCC 
seem to have adopted a more flexible approach in which the courts are allowed to grant 
interim injunctions on the basis of strong suspicion of fraud and do not require proof 
of the beneficiary’s knowledge of fraud.  
The dissertation has also examined the flexible approach from the international 
perspective within the framework of the UNCITRAL Convention as discussed in 
chapter 6. Most importantly, the Convention contains detailed examples of the fraud 
exception provisions that can offer a substantial practical guidance to the national 
courts including South Africa. Like Revised UCC Article 5, the Convention 
demonstrates a more flexible approach, requiring evidence of clear and manifest fraud 
as the basis to withhold payment and does not mention that the wrongdoer’s intention 
must be proven. Thus the Convention’s approach is heavily centred on the nature of 
the misconduct rather than the intention of the fraudulent party.12 With regard to 
provisional court measures, the Convention is strict enough with the applicants while 
still being flexible enough to permit the granting of such legal remedies only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
In examining the implementation of the fraud rule under South African law, there 
is a need to be mindful that certain scopes of the fraud exception have gradually 
changed overtime in selected common law jurisdictions as well at international level 
in keeping with the commercial trends of that time as determined by the judiciary of 
the day. This trend is evident from, for example, the way the United States have and 
the UNCITRAL Convention have reassessed the implementation of the fraud rule in 
light of the international business community’s expectations. The South African law 
on the other hand, is lagging behind some way. However, if such laudable scopes are 
                                               
 
10 HY Low ‘Confusion and difficulties surrounding the fraud rule in letters of credit: an English 
perspective’ (2011) 17 JIML 462 at 471. 
11 Gao op cit (n3) 130. 
12 Ibid 97. 
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embraced by the South African courts and allow a step forward beyond the traditional 
scopes of the fraud rule, then there is no reason why the South African courts ought 
not to close this gap by way of adopting a flexible approach. However, the momentum 
to do so, lies upon the South African courts and the concerned national legislators to 
consider the fact that the certain scopes of the strict approach that were for a long time 
unchallengeable, ought to yield to the commercial trends of the day. 
II Recommendations 
This dissertation has shown from the comparative perspective that the South African 
courts have adopted a narrow and strict approach to the application of the fraud rule, 
which is more weighted on the autonomy arguments than preventing the proliferation 
of fraud. In the light of limited case law, it is suggested that the South African courts 
should also consider adoption of a preferable approach in the following four key areas: 
(a) Standard of fraud 
The South African courts, like the English Courts, seem to have settled that the 
beneficiary’s knowledge as the standard of fraud. The problem associated with the 
standard of intentional fraud is that proof of the beneficiary’s actual intention or 
knowledge is difficult to establish whether at trial or in an interim interdict. Due to 
these hurdles imposed on the applicant by this standard, the allocation of risk is 
unfairly in favour of the beneficiary. Another potential loophole presented with this 
standard is that in a case of fraud involving a third party, the beneficiary may easily 
get away with it, if the applicant fails to show proof the beneficiary’s knowledge when 
in actual fact the beneficiary was involved in conspiracy with a third party.13 In this 
regard, it is suggested that the South African courts should consider adopting an 
objective standard as seen from the United States and the UNCITRAL Convention. As 
observed by one expert in letters of credit fraud, a proper approach to the fraud 
exception that can to a large extent enhance the predictability of the fraud rule, is one 
that takes a combination of material fraud as a general standard, which is encapsulated 
in revised UCC Article 5, s 5-109 and the provisions of Article 19 the UNCITRAL 
Convention as detailed examples.14  
 
                                               
 
13 Ibid 133. 
14 Ibid 99. 
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(b) Fraud in the underlying transaction 
So far, a handful of South African cases have shown that the courts have not yet dealt 
with the question whether the fraud exception extends to fraud in the underlying 
transaction. In the absence of case law, it is suggested that the South African courts 
should consider following a wide approach in line with that adopted by the United 
States and the UNCITRAL Convention. The main justification for adopting a wider 
view of the fraud exception stems from the policy considerations that it serves no 
commercial purpose to accept the fraud exception, yet on the other end disregard the 
fraud committed by the beneficiary in the underlying transaction. Fraud jeopardises 
the integrity of the letters of credit system, and the effect is the same whether be it 
fraud in the documents or in the underlying transaction.  
(c) Standard of proof in interim interdicts 
Analysis of the South African position shows that there is gap in the degree of evidence 
required and the issue still remain unsettled under South African law. Some lesson 
from the English jurisprudence is that the English courts have generally accepted that 
the appropriate test to determine whether there is clear evidence of fraud is that it is 
‘seriously arguable that on the material, the only realistic inference to draw is that of 
fraud’. It is suggested that the South African courts should follow the English courts’ 
approach in this regard.  
(d) Flexibility in issuing of interdicts as a means to prevent fraud 
Similarly to the English courts, the South African courts have strictly applied the fraud 
exception to an extent making the granting of an injunction almost unattainable. It 
creates unsatisfactory position to accept the general condemnation of fraud, yet on the 
other hand, making it nearly impossible for the parties to have access to legal remedies 
necessary for prevention of fraud. In contrast, the United States, like the UNCITRAL 
Convention, has adopted a flexible approach that allows the courts to issue an interim 
injunction on the basis of suspicion of fraud. It is suggested that the South African 
courts should follow an approach that falls between the strict approach favoured by 
the English and the more relaxed approach espoused by the United States.  
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